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Dynamic Corporate Purpose:
Decentralizing the Choice over
Director Orientation
The debate over corporate purpose has turned into a “gordian knot”
where parties with entrenched beliefs about what the corporation should or
should not be within society refuse to waver. There are inherent flaws with the
governance models proposed by academics, politicians, and practitioners alike,
so a novel method for setting and maintaining corporate purpose is required.
This Note asks why there must be a one-size-fits-all approach to purpose and
proposes a solution: dynamic corporate purpose.
This Note argues that states should not mandate all corporations hold
the same corporate purpose but instead should use the logic of the public benefit
corporation structure that allows for the firm to select its own purpose. By
decentralizing corporate purpose, states like Delaware can leverage the
economic advantages of shareholder primacy while also giving corporations
flexibility to provide greater public benefits. States can harness the advantages
of stakeholder capitalism without sacrificing the accountability and clarity of
shareholder primacy. Exposing corporate purpose to market forces uses natural
tension points to avoid traditional pitfalls of stakeholder-focused models—this
is the power of dynamic corporate purpose.
To do so, this Note first discusses the historical evolution of the debate
between shareholder primacy and stakeholder governance before analyzing the
advantages and disadvantages of existing and proposed governance
mechanisms. Dynamic corporate purpose fills this gap in an effort to minimize
the disadvantages of existing mechanisms to provide the state with a model for
economic and societal success.
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INTRODUCTION
Some considered it a hollow public relations stunt, 1 but in 2019
the Business Roundtable lit a fire in the academic debate over a simple
question: for whom is the corporation managed? 2 While most scholars
generally agree that the role of corporations is to advance societal
welfare—either economically or more broadly—vigorous debate
surrounds the appropriate mechanism for corporations to maximize
such welfare. 3 Should corporations be laser focused on shareholders to

1.
See Elizabeth Warren, Business Roundtable Declaration “Was Just an Empty Publicity
Stunt,” FAST CO. (Sept. 29, 2020), https://www.fastcompany.com/90557370/elizabeth-warrenbusiness-roundtable-declaration-was-just-an-empty-publicity-stunt
[https://perma.cc/3V8WAUR7]; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance,
106 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 98 (2020) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Tallarita, Illusory Promise] (describing
the change as “largely representing a rhetorical public relations move”); Lucian A. Bebchuk &
Roberto Tallarita, Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders?, 75 VAND. L. REV.
(forthcoming
2022),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3899421
[https://perma.cc/2R2P-C26X] [hereinafter Bebchuk & Tallarita, Will Corporations Deliver Value]
(showing empirically that the statement did not represent a meaningful commitment by signatory
companies). Interestingly, Senator Warren and Professor Bebchuk are considered to be on opposite
sides of the corporate-purpose spectrum, showing the complex and compelling web of perspectives
in this debate.
2.
Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/ourcommitment
[https://perma.cc/4UJ4-2HSL]
[hereinafter 2019 Business Roundtable Statement] (suggesting each corporation pursues its own
corporate purpose and promising to support stakeholders beyond shareholders).
3.
See Edward Rock, For Whom Is the Corporation Managed in 2020?: The Debate Over
Corporate Purpose 5–6 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., L. Working Paper No. 515, 2020) (arguing
shareholder primacy advocates suggest that “the focus on shareholders is a tool for increasing
social welfare and not an end in itself”). But see Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Law and the Team
Production Problem 2 (Vand. L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 12-12, 2012) (arguing that advocates
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minimize agency costs between owners and managers, or should
corporations have a wider purview to support the interests of
nonshareholders more directly? This Note takes stock of how the debate
between shareholder primacy and stakeholder governance has
developed since the 1930s, through the 1980s, and into the twenty-first
century. Much has changed since legal scholar Adolf Berle and
economists Gardiner Means and Milton Friedman analyzed the
corporation’s role within society, but the question remains at the heart
of capitalism—should corporations prioritize shareholders to maximize
economic benefit, or can directors effectively balance the interests of
stakeholders to maximize societal benefit?
This Note argues that because of the increasing power of
consumers and institutional investors, the market itself can resolve the
debate between shareholder primacy and stakeholder capitalism if
states apply the logic of public benefit corporations (“PBC” or “PBCs”)
and require corporations to set their own corporate purposes. 4 This idea
of dynamic corporate purpose contends that the state does not need to
provide a one-size-fits-all approach for directors to balance the interests
of shareholders and stakeholders so long as investors have clarity as to
the purpose of individual firms. Part I of this Note provides the
backdrop against which the argument between shareholder primacy
and stakeholder governance has developed over the last one hundred
years. Part II breaks down the advantages and disadvantages of
structures that policymakers have experimented with or advocated for,
in an attempt to illustrate the decisions states can make in the years to
come. 5 Finally, Part III lays out the framework for states to implement
dynamic corporate purpose to leverage the advantages of shareholder
primacy without neglecting the interests of wider stakeholder groups.
Thereafter, Delaware, and other states, can better align the interests of
corporations with those of society by prompting individual corporations
to report against a clear, enumerated purpose.

of shareholder primacy have backed away from the idea that maximizing share value maximizes
the firm’s social value).
4.
“If you want to fix something, expose it to market forces.” Mike Speiser (@laserlikemike),
TWITTER (Jan. 6, 2022, 1:06 PM), https://twitter.com/laserlikemike/status/1479152310739607554
[https://perma.cc/C4DQ-JPE6].
5.
See John G. Ruggie, Caroline Rees & Rachel Davis, Making ‘Stakeholder Capitalism’
Work: Contributions from Business & Human Rights 3 (Harv. Kennedy Sch. Fac. Rsch. Working
Paper Series, RWP 20-034, 2020) (saying the question has shifted “from whether corporate boards
should take stakeholder interests into account, to how it should do so”).
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF CORPORATE LAW IN DELAWARE
A. History and Norms of Shareholder Primacy
When legal scholars discuss shareholder primacy, the first case
that typically comes to mind is Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. 6 While the case
did not establish shareholder primacy, it is the most poignant example
of directors being admonished by a state court for not pursuing
shareholder wealth maximization. 7 The case was heard by the Michigan
Supreme Court, so its holding is not binding elsewhere, but its
conceptual application of corporate purpose as the central driver of
agency problems between corporations and their owners has
reverberated through academia for the past century. 8
Corporate law, and the requisite treatment of shareholders by
directors, is governed by state law. 9 States charter businesses and often
compete with other states in the laws and institutions governing these
corporations in order to charter more for greater state revenue. 10
Delaware is winning—sixty percent of the Fortune 500 is chartered in
the state, which has a population of a million people. 11 While it was
Michigan that affirmed the construct of shareholder primacy by holding
that Ford could not use cash to lower prices and raise salaries in an
effort to avoid paying dividends to minority shareholders, 12 Delaware
has its own line of cases that strengthen the idea that directors must

6.
170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business corporation is organized and carried on
primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that
end.”).
7.
Id. (holding that Ford’s decision to end special dividends for shareholders to lower prices
for customers breached the duty to operate the business for shareholder interests).
8.
See, e.g., Michael J. Vargas, Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. at 100: The Enduring Legacy of
Corporate Law’s Most Controversial Case, 75 BUS. LAW. 2103, 2118 (2020) (describing how the case
is rarely cited in case law but is oft cited in the legal academy).
9.
Lev Menand & Morgan Ricks, Federal Corporate Law and the Business of Banking 1 (Eur.
Corp. Governance Inst., L. Working Paper No. 575, 2021) (“It is a bedrock (though still
controversial) principle of American business law that corporate formation and governance are the
province of state, not federal, law.”).
10. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO
L. REV. 709, 709–11 (1987) (assessing whether states competing for corporate-law supremacy is a
“race for the bottom”).
11. Peter A. Atkins, Marc S. Gerber & Edward B. Micheletti, Social Responsibility and
Enlighted Shareholder Primacy: Views from the Courtroom and Boardroom, SKADDEN, ARPS,
SLATE,
MEAGHER
&
FLOM
LLP
(Feb.
4,
2019),
https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2019/02/social-responsibility-and-enlightenedshareholder [https://perma.cc/3HEQ-AN5F]; QuickFacts: Delaware, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/DE (last visited Jan. 5, 2022) [https://perma.cc/Z4CG-L7RG].
12. Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
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look to maximize profits. 13 Like any federalist construct, different states
have taken other approaches, and many have been less inclined to
support such staunch shareholder primacy. 14
Nevertheless, Delaware is the power center of corporate law
because of the depth of its case law and the concentration of
corporations in the state. There, three court opinions lay the foundation
for shareholder primacy and its boundaries. First, Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. held that when sale of the
corporation is inevitable, directors must act to obtain the best price for
shareholders. 15 By this logic, directors cannot consider factors that
support interests of other stakeholders if those factors limit financial
outcomes
for
shareholders. 16
After
Revlon,
Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc. seemingly limited shareholder
primacy in Delaware by saying “absent a limited set of circumstances
as defined under Revlon, a board of directors, while always required to
act in an informed manner, is not under any per se duty to maximize
shareholder value in the short term, even in the context of a takeover.” 17
But this limitation did not last. In 2010, the Delaware Chancery Court
ruled in eBay v. Newmark that directors have an obligation to attempt
to earn profits so long as some special character (e.g., status as a
nonprofit) is not stated in the firm’s charter. 18 Succinctly put, “[t]he
[traditional] corporate form . . . is not an appropriate vehicle for purely
philanthropic ends, at least not when there are other stockholders
interested in realizing a return on their investment.” 19 Corporate form
matters in the state of Delaware, and for-profit Delaware corporations

13. See, e.g., eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“The
corporate form in which craigslist operates, however, is not an appropriate vehicle for purely
philanthropic ends, at least not when there are other stockholders interested in realizing a return
on their investment.”); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182
(Del. 1986) (“The Revlon board’s authorization permitting management to negotiate a merger or
buyout with a third party was a recognition that the company was for sale. The duty of the board
had thus changed . . . [to] the maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’
benefit.”).
14. See, e.g., A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 585 (N.J. 1953) (permitting
charitable gifts); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (permitting
stakeholder interest balancing).
15. 506 A.2d at 182 (“The duty of the board had thus changed from the preservation of Revlon
as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’
benefit.”).
16. When discussing “stakeholders” broadly, I include five groups commonly bundled
together: employees, customers, communities, suppliers, and the environment. While shareholders
are certainly stakeholders themselves, this Note refers to stakeholders as nonshareholders that
are directly affected by corporate decisions.
17. 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1990).
18. 16 A.3d at 6, 34–35.
19. Id. at 34.
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are expected to “promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of
[their] stockholders.” 20 While directors can make strategic decisions
that also advance other stakeholder interests, “[p]romoting, protecting,
or pursuing nonstockholder considerations must lead at some point to
value for stockholders.” 21 These cases suggest there are contours to
shareholder primacy, but nevertheless the prevailing conceptual rule
for most directors in Delaware is to maximize shareholder wealth. 22
Delaware case law is just the beginning—influential norms have
been advanced by academics and taught in law and business school
classrooms around the country. 23 Academic discussions on shareholder
primacy most notably began with debate between Professors Merrick
Dodd and Adolf Berle following the stock market crash of 1929.
Professor Berle argued that directors were too unaccountable to
shareholders, so pure director discretion should be limited by a clear
orientation toward shareholder interests. 24 In response, Professor Dodd
emphasized that pure profit focus by corporations was undesirable, and
wider-scope decisionmaking improves corporate performance. 25 The
next year, Professor Berle wrote in more detail how the separation of
ownership and control between managers and rationally apathetic
shareholders leads to considerable agency problems, and shareholder
primacy reduces these concerns. 26 In general, these academics seem to
be optimizing for different goals, such as limiting agency problems or
curing societal ills through corporate purpose, so it is unsurprising that
the methods for accomplishing such goals differ as well.
Milton Friedman took this concept a step further in his notorious
1970 New York Times essay. 27 Professor Friedman, in what later
20. Id.
21. Id. at 33; see also In re Pattern Energy Grp. Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 2020-0357-MTZ,
2021 WL 1812674, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 6, 2021) (denying a motion to dismiss where directors
prioritized insiders and a supplier over the interests of minority shareholders).
22. David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 181, 184 (2013)
(arguing that “shareholder primacy is indeed the law”). But see Blair, supra note 3, at 10 (saying
“corporate law does not require that directors or managers must maximize share value” except
when in a Revlon situation).
23. See David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013, 1015 (2013)
(suggesting shareholder primacy is a norm cultivated “in the leading business schools, in board
rooms, and in the business press”).
24. A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1073–74
(1931).
25. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1145, 1153–55 (1932).
26. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 352–57 (1932).
27. Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine—The Social Responsibility of Business Is to
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 1970), https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/afriedman-doctrine-the-social-responsibility-of-business-is-to.html [https://perma.cc/RUZ3-SMN9].
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became known as the Friedman Doctrine, asserted the only corporate
social responsibility is to create shareholder value—managers are
responsible for conducting business in accordance with the desires of
shareholders. 28 Friedman argued not only that agency problems should
be dealt with by orienting directors toward shareholder interests but
also that shareholder primacy was the best proxy for wider societal
interests. 29 Professor Bebchuk has reiterated this point in his modern
writings that support strict shareholder primacy as a method for
maximizing shareholder and stakeholder welfare. 30
While some academics have been emphatic about the presence
of strict shareholder primacy, others debate whether it is simply a norm
in Delaware or whether case law has fully incorporated the concept. Leo
Strine, a former Chancellor in Delaware, for example, is adamant that
shareholder primacy is baked into the case law of the state. 31 Others,
however, disagree about the intractability of shareholder primacy or
suggest that critics overstate the tension created by orienting toward
shareholders. 32 Professor Lynn Stout went so far as to argue the
“dogma” of shareholder primacy “lacks any solid basis in actual
corporate law.” 33 In her view, the business judgment rule provides
directors “virtually unfettered legal discretion to determine the
corporation’s goals” and the flexibility to make long-term decisions that
may reduce profitability. 34 While Stout was correct in saying the
business judgment rule provides directors wide latitude in
decisionmaking, the norm that directors are expected to prioritize

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Bebchuk & Tallarita, Illusory Promise, supra note 1, at 98 (discussing the conceptual
issues with “pluralistic stakeholderism and its implementation”).
31. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of
the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 765–68 (2015) (“The contention that [the Delaware General
Corporation Law] proves directors are free to promote interests other than those of stockholders
ignores the many ways in which the DGCL focuses corporate managers on stockholder welfare by
allocating power only to a single constituency, the stockholders.”); see also Yosifon, supra note 22
(arguing shareholder primacy is the law of the land in Delaware).
32. Millon, supra note 23, at 1015 (asserting strict shareholder primacy is “not grounded in
legal doctrine” and is instead grounded in the manifestation of social norms); Blair, supra note 3,
at 10.
33. Lynn A. Stout, Issues in Governance Studies: The Problem of Corporate Purpose, 48
GOVERNANCE
STUD.
BROOKINGS
1,
4
(2012),
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/Stout_Corporate-Issues.pdf [https://perma.cc/NC4T-D7PN].
34. Id. at 5. Stout also cites Air Products & Chemicals Inc. v. Airgas, Inc. as evidence that
directors are not actually required to maximize shareholder wealth. Id. (citing Air Prods. &
Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 98 (Del. Ch. 2011)) (suggesting that if Revlon duties have
not kicked in, the board “is not under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value in the short
term, even in the context of a takeover”).
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shareholders is still widely held and powerful. 35 At the very least, there
is a decided norm that directors should act to maximize shareholder
value. Otherwise we would not see directors justifying actions that
clearly support stakeholders by their perceived positive impacts on
shareholders. So, while there are norms of shareholder primacy based
on specific fact patterns within Delaware case law, there is debate on
the contours and boundaries of the concept, which only increases
uncertainty in the marketplace and the classroom. 36
B. The Emergence of Stakeholder Theory and the Modern Debate
In 1951, Frank Abrams, the chairman of Standard Oil in New
Jersey, wrote, “the job of professional management . . . is . . . to
maintain an equitable and workable balance among the claims of the
various directly interested groups.” 37 This statement encapsulates the
stakeholder theory of capitalism: directors should be permitted, or even
required, to advance the interests of a variety of interested groups—not
just shareholders. 38 Many actually viewed stakeholder theory as the
dominant concept of director orientation until Professor Friedman’s

35. See, e.g., Peter A. Atkins, Marc S. Gerber, Edward B. Micheletti & Robert S. Saunders,
Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: Back to Delaware Law Basics, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER &
FLOM LLP (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2020/02/directorsfiduciary-duties [https://perma.cc/9YQU-3TNG] (explaining that directors’ duty of loyalty
“requires acting . . . in the best interests of the company and its stockholders”). But see Margaret
M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 280–
81 (1999):
Thus, the primary job of the board of directors of a public corporation is not to act as
agents who ruthlessly pursue shareholders’ interests at the expense of employees,
creditors, or other team members. Rather, the directors are trustees for the corporation
itself—mediating hierarchs whose job is to balance team members’ competing interests
in a fashion that keeps everyone happy enough that the productive coalition stays
together.
(emphasis added).
36. See David G. Yosifon, Opting Out of Shareholder Primacy: Is the Public Benefit
Corporation Trivial?, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 461, 463 (2017) (“Whether and how corporate purpose
can be altered from the shareholder primacy rule is now a pressing matter of organizational law.”).
Pressure on directors to maximize shareholder wealth may be a norm created by the relative power
of financial institutions as opposed to adherence to statutory or case law. As discussed infra Part
III, reform to increase clarity will improve the corporate governance regime regardless of whether
shareholder orientation is norm or law.
37. Frank W. Abrams, Management’s Responsibilities in a Complex World, 29 HARV. BUS.
REV. 29, 29 (1951) (shortly thereafter, Abrams included stockholders, employees, customers, and
the public at large as the “interested groups”); see also id. at 30 (saying businesses “can be made
to achieve their greatest social usefulness—and thus their future can be best assured—when
management succeeds in finding a harmonious balance among the claims of the various interested
groups”).
38. See Blair & Stout, supra note 35, at 280–81 (arguing directors have a fundamentally
different role within the organization and are not required to prioritize shareholders).
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essay in 1970 and the spree of hostile takeovers in the 1980s. 39 Since,
and in the aftermath of the 2009 financial crisis, many have blamed
shareholder primacy for increasingly apparent societal externalities
caused by corporate action and for increasing economic inequality in the
country. 40
Intensity behind the opposition to shareholder primacy has
increased over the last decade. Preeminent corporate attorney Martin
Lipton said, “acceptance of and reliance on the Friedman doctrine has
been widely eroded, as a growing consensus of business leaders,
economists, investors, lawyers, policymakers and important parts of the
academic community have embraced stakeholder capitalism as the key
to sustainable, broad-based, long-term American prosperity.” 41 As
Lipton suggests, he is not alone as business leaders have begun to
publicly advocate for consideration of wider stakeholder interests. 42
Most notably, the Business Roundtable, an organization made up of
leading chief executives, reversed its position on prioritizing
shareholders in its 2019 Statement on the Purpose of the Corporation. 43
In the 2019 statement, the business leaders suggested each corporation
serves its own “corporate purpose,” but the signatories committed to
advancing the interests of stakeholders: customers, employees,
39. See Sanjai Bhagat & R. Glenn Hubbard, For Whom Should Corporations Be Run?, AM.
ENTER. INST.: AEIDEAS (Sept. 4, 2020), https://www.aei.org/economics/for-whom-shouldcorporations-be-run [https://perma.cc/M66T-4JW2] (suggesting Friedman was responding to
unfocused corporations of the 1960s and 1970s where managers could “pursue other objectives
than the long-term value of the enterprise for its owners—shareholders”); Lynn A. Stout, New
Thinking on “Shareholder Primacy,” 2 ACCT., ECON., & L. 1, 2 (2012).
40. See, e.g., Matthew T. Bodie, Income Inequality and Corporate Structure, 45 STETSON L.
REV. 69, 74 (2015) (finding it unsurprising that the “corporate power structure [is] driving the
growing inequality in the distribution of income”); Anna Stansbury & Lawrence H. Summers, The
Declining Worker Power Hypothesis: An Explanation for the Recent Evolution of the American
Economy 55–57 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27193, 2020),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w27193 [https://perma.cc/WUC6-TZGN] (attributing a portion of
inequality to power dynamics within corporate governance).
41. Martin Lipton, The Friedman Essay and the True Purpose of the Business Corporation,
L.
SCH.
F.
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
(Sept.
17,
2020),
HARV.
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/09/17/the-friedman-essay-and-the-true-purpose-of-thebusiness-corporation [https://perma.cc/9WJ7-CS83].
42. See, e.g., Jenny Bloom, It’s All a Matter of Trust, MEDIUM (Mar. 23, 2021),
https://medium.com/third-prime/third-prime-its-all-a-matter-of-trust-3a5d2292a5fb
[https://perma.cc/A5T2-A9UE] (“We hypothesize that this past year’s need for swift action, mixed
with businesses’ ability to execute without the friction of systematized checks and balances, has
amplified the call for businesses to accept the mantle of social leadership.”).
43. Compare 2019 Business Roundtable Statement, supra note 2 (stating that it was
“modernizing principles on the role of a corporation” by explicitly acknowledging that corporations
need to “create value for all our stakeholders” and not shareholders alone), with Statement on
Corporate Governance, BUS. ROUNDTABLE 3 (Sept. 1997) [hereinafter 1997 Business Roundtable
Statement] (stating “[t]he notion that the board must somehow balance the interests of
stockholders against the interests of other stakeholders fundamentally misconstrues the role of
directors”).
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suppliers, communities, and shareholders. 44 Larry Fink, CEO of
BlackRock—the largest institutional investor—has consistently argued
that companies must do more than just maximize shareholder wealth,
and he has ramped up his rhetoric since 2019 as more voices support
stakeholder capitalism. 45 Countless other business leaders have
discussed the importance of maximizing stakeholder interests to
maximize firm value. 46 Thus, some view stakeholder orientation as the
best method to maximize shareholder wealth, while others favor a
construct where businesses optimize for wider societal welfare
regardless of shareholder return on investment. 47
Business leaders are not the only public figures calling for more
board action focused on stakeholders—progressive politicians have
taken up stakeholder capitalism as a main talking point in a quest to
defeat growing income inequality. Senator Elizabeth Warren, for
example, introduced the Accountable Capitalism Act in an attempt to
rid the country of “fundamental” economic problems by shifting
corporate law away from a shareholder primacy model and mandating
that directors consider the interests of stakeholders. 48 In his campaign
for the Democratic nomination for President in 2020, Bernie Sanders
often called for greater labor control of corporations in an effort to shift
44. 2019 Business Roundtable Statement, supra note 2. But see Bebchuk & Tallarita, Will
Corporations Deliver Value, supra note 1 (showing the signatories did not commit to anything and,
instead, simply sought positive publicity).
45. Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2019 Letter to CEOs: Profit & Purpose, BLACKROCK,
https://www.blackrock.com/americas-offshore/2019-larry-fink-ceo-letter (last visited Oct. 5, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/34EC-LWYU] (“Purpose is not the sole pursuit of profits but the animating force
for achieving them.”); Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2018 Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (JAN. 17, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/01/17/asense-of-purpose [https://perma.cc/9DQR-RPRK] (“As we enter 2018, BlackRock is eager to
participate in discussions about long-term value creation and work to build a better framework for
serving all your stakeholders.”); Andrew Ross Sorkin, World’s Biggest Investor Tells C.E.O.s
Purpose Is the ‘Animating Force’ for Profits, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Jan. 17, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/17/business/dealbook/blackrock-larry-fink-letter.html
[https://perma.cc/4PJE-U9TH].
46. This is most applicable to consumer-facing brands and seems to be less apparent in
business-to-business (“B2B”) industries. Andrew Ross Sorkin, A Free Market Manifesto That
Changed the World, Reconsidered, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Sept. 14, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/11/business/dealbook/milton-friedman-doctrine-socialresponsibility-of-business.html [https://perma.cc/N4U6-Z4YB].
47. Id. According to Howard Schultz, former chairman of Starbucks:
The ethos fueling such efforts—that companies have a responsibility to enhance the
societies in which they flourish—was integral to Starbucks’s ability to employ great
people and attract customers, which in turn drove a 21,826 percent return to
shareholders between 1992 and 2018, the year I stepped down as executive chairman.
Id.
48. Press Release, Elizabeth Warren, Sen., Warren Introduces Accountable Capitalism Act
(Aug. 15. 2018), https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/warren-introducesaccountable-capitalism-act [https://perma.cc/2CHY-VPEZ].
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the focus from strictly shareholder wealth maximization toward the
interests of other stakeholders like workers. 49 Joe Biden, in his
eventually successful campaign for President, called for an end to
shareholder capitalism. 50 Thus, the consensus around shareholder
primacy seems to have eroded among some business and political
leaders alike, strengthening calls for corporate action and reform to
capitalism in Delaware and beyond. 51
C. Purpose and Delaware Benefit Corporations
While academics and legislators have historically thought of
director orientation from a top-down approach—what the law says
directors must do—there have been some ways that directors have
taken a bottom-up approach to supporting stakeholders through
“purpose.” That is, management sets a specific corporate purpose—
either in the charter or more informally—to orient itself toward specific
interests. 52 Delaware has gone so far as to codify this bottom-up
approach in the form of a “public benefit corporation” in section 362 of
the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”). 53 In fact, Delaware
has found such success with the PBC model that the state has decreased
the threshold for shareholders to switch to a PBC from requiring ninety
percent shareholder approval to requiring just a simple majority. 54
49. Issues:
Corporate
Accountability
and
Democracy,
BERNIE
SANDERS,
https://berniesanders.com/issues/corporate-accountability-and-democracy (last visited Jan. 4,
2022) [https://perma.cc/MN7L-S44M].
50. Jesse Pound, Biden Says Investors ‘Don’t Need Me,’ Calls for End of ‘Era of Shareholder
Capitalism,’ CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/09/biden-says-investors-dont-need-me-callsfor-end-of-era-of-shareholder-capitalism.html (last updated July 10, 2020, 10:55 AM)
[https://perma.cc/WQN7-ASZF]. Of course, these are national political figures, and ridding
corporate America of greed is a popular refrain, but this does little to reverse the underlying state
corporate law on the matter. Shareholder capitalism is virtually interchangeable with shareholder
primacy.
51. But see Andy Kessler, Opinion, Inequality by Way of Government, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 28,
2021, 12:51 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/inequality-by-way-of-government-11616950304
[https://perma.cc/CK9G-9LZ8] (arguing inequality is not created by capitalist policies but instead
is driven by “misguided government interventions”).
52. Purpose statements are common. For example, Chobani’s founding purpose was “[t]o
make better food for more people,” and Lego aims “[t]o inspire and develop the builders of
tomorrow.” Afdhel Aziz, The Power of Purpose: The 7 Elements of a Great Purpose Statement (Part
2), FORBES (Feb. 18, 2020, 1:35 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/afdhelaziz/2020/02/18/thepower-of-purpose-the-7-elements-of-a-great-purpose-statement-paet-2/?sh=4f45318d41b7
[https://perma.cc/PM8C-35EZ].
53. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362 (2021).
54. Michael R. Littenberg, Emily J. Oldshue & Brittany N. Pifer, Delaware Public Benefit
Corporations—Recent Developments, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Aug. 31, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/08/31/delaware-public-benefit-corporations-recentdevelopments [https://perma.cc/S2FS-EYZL]. Some shareholders, in response to the Business
Roundtable Statement, even requested their boards to amend their charters to turn the
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The status as a PBC is not unique to Delaware—there are
similar forms available in thirty-six other states 55—but Delaware’s
form is impactful due to the otherwise strict shareholder primacy in the
state. 56 PBCs in Delaware are to be “managed in a manner that
balances the stockholders’ pecuniary interests, the best interests of
those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the public
benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of incorporation.” 57
Similar to the requirements of directors in traditional corporations,
PBC directors fulfill their fiduciary duties to shareholders and the
enumerated public benefit(s) so long as decisions are “informed and
disinterested and not such that no person of ordinary, sound judgment
would approve.” 58 In other words, directors are permitted to apply their
own business judgment in balancing the interests of shareholders and
other stakeholders. 59 In addition to the normal reporting requirements,
PBCs are required to biennially provide “a statement as to the
corporation’s promotion of the public benefit or public benefits
identified,” and some corporations report more than the legal
requirement to become certified through third-party agents. 60 If leaders
are invested enough in the enumerated public benefit and willing to
report against progress, PBCs provide a legitimate route to pursue
stakeholder interests. 61 Companies have sought benefit corporation
status for numerous reasons ranging from altruistic to strategic, but
corporation into PBCs in order to effectively implement the tenants of the Statement. Bebchuk &
Tallarita, Will Corporations Deliver Value, supra note 1, manuscript at 31.
55. See State by State Status of Legislation, BENEFIT CORP. (last visited Oct. 5, 2021),
https://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status
[https://perma.cc/8B9F-ZPN5]
(displaying information on the status of benefit-corporation legislation in all states containing such
statutes).
56. See generally James Surowiecki, Companies with Benefits, NEW YORKER (July 28, 2014),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/08/04/companies-benefits
[https://perma.cc/4UUEPLXT] (explaining how PBCs diverge from the shareholder primacy model).
57. tit. 8, § 362(a).
58. Littenberg et al., supra note 54.
59. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making It Easier for Directors to “Do the Right Thing”?, 4 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. 235, 242 (2014) (saying “the benefit corporation is a modest evolution that builds on
the American tradition of corporate law” in comparing the structure of governance in a PBC to
that of traditional corporations).
60. tit. 8, § 366(b).
61. Markedly, in 2021, publicly traded Veeva Systems voted with ninety-nine percent
shareholder approval to convert from a traditional Delaware corporation to a PBC. Press Release,
Veeva, Veeva Becomes First Public Company to Convert to a Public Benefit Corporation (Jan. 13,
2021),
https://www.veeva.com/resources/veeva-becomes-first-public-company-to-convert-to-apublic-benefit-corporation [https://perma.cc/9UXR-8U5P]. Further, Lemonade went public as a
PBC in 2020, and their stock price more than doubled in its first day of trading. Wallace Witkowski,
Lemonade Logs Best U.S. IPO Debut of 2020 with More Than 140% Gain, MARKETWATCH (July 2,
2020, 6:40 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/lemonade-logs-best-ipo-debut-of-2020-withmore-than-140-gain-2020-07-02 [https://perma.cc/MW4G-RPXA].
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some worry this status insulates management from investor pressure. 62
Nevertheless, providing a route for some corporations to consider and
report progress toward stakeholder interests is a clear step away from
strict shareholder primacy and could increase adoption of stakeholder
capitalism within Delaware’s current regime. 63
From a bottom-up perspective, informal purpose statements
have grown in popularity as business schools preach the concept that
purpose leads to greater profit. 64 The Enacting Purpose Initiative, for
example, has developed a framework to make purpose more than
merely “a marketing slogan or vague set of values” to deliver actual
value for shareholders and stakeholders alike. 65 In advancing a “New
Paradigm,” Martin Lipton called for “a voluntary collaboration among
corporations, shareholders, and other stakeholders to achieve
sustainable long-term value and resist short-termism.” 66 Today,
businesses are leveraging “purpose” strategically to advance
shareholder value by orienting daily conduct toward stakeholders—and
it is leading these “purpose-driven businesses” to outperform the overall
market. 67 But, importantly, if these businesses are incorporated in the
state of Delaware, they tend to engage in a roundabout analysis of how
stakeholder-supporting action helps shareholders in order to fulfil their
fiduciary duties. With the shareholder landscape changing drastically
since shareholder primacy took hold of corporations in the 1980s, 68 more
62. Surowiecki, supra note 56.
63. See Strine, supra note 59, at 242 (“In the liberal tradition of incremental, achievable
reform rather than radical renovation, the benefit corporation is a modest evolution that builds on
the American tradition of corporate law.”).
64. See George Serafeim & Claudine Gartenberg, The Type of Purpose That Makes Companies
More Profitable, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 21, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/10/the-type-of-purpose-thatmakes-companies-more-profitable [https://perma.cc/PN4K-AFTK] (describing the increased
dialogue about purpose since 1995 and examining research data comparing purpose statements
with financial performance).
65. RUPERT YOUNGER, COLIN MAYER & ROBERT G. ECCLES, ENACTING PURPOSE WITHIN THE
MODERN CORPORATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR BOARDS OF DIRECTORS 12–14 (2020),
https://www.enactingpurpose.org/assets/enacting-purpose-initiative---eu-report-august-2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4R2L-FZA3].
66. Martin Lipton, It’s Time to Adopt the New Paradigm, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Feb. 11, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/11/its-time-to-adopt-thenew-paradigm [https://perma.cc/V9DB-B5ZN].
67. See Statistics, BUS. PURPOSE, https://www.businessofpurpose.com/statistics (last visited
Oct. 31, 2021) [https://perma.cc/5L9G-3CLR] (providing statistics on how “[p]urpose-driven
businesses outperform the market”).
68. Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99 B.U. L. REV. 721, 733,
736 (2019) (explaining how three institutional investors—BlackRock, Vanguard, and State
Street—collectively cast twenty-five percent of the votes on S&P 500 companies representing a
four hundred percent increase in voting power since 1998); see also John C. Coates, The Future of
Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of Twelve 2, 10 (Harv. Pub. L. Working Paper No. 1907,
2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/John-Coates.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9AKV-CNHR] (arguing that power is concentrated in the hands of twelve
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voting power has supported this stakeholder-support-to-advanceshareholder-interests concept, leaving corporate conduct somewhere in
between the two poles. 69 Thus, the changing landscape is creating
friction in the current system where the legal regime may not reflect
actual corporate behavior, which only increases the calls for reform. 70
II. SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY VERSUS STAKEHOLDER THEORY
As the power dynamic has shifted between shareholders and
stakeholders, states and politicians have provided a spectrum of
possible policy outcomes for treating these classes of interested parties.
This ranges from mandating that directors prioritize shareholders 71 to
permitting consideration of various stakeholder interests 72 to
mandating that directors consider stakeholders. 73 This spectrum of

individuals); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Don’t Let the Short-Termism Bogeyman Scare You, HARV. BUS.
REV., Jan.–Feb. 2021, https://hbr.org/2021/01/dont-let-the-short-termism-bogeyman-scare-you
[https://perma.cc/6HUG-32AS] (asserting that “concentration of ownership has introduced the
possibility of meaningful investor oversight”).
69. See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, BlackRock’s Message: Contribute to Society, or Risk Losing
Our
Support,
N.Y.
TIMES:
DEALBOOK
(Jan.
15,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/15/business/dealbook/blackrock-laurence-fink-letter.html
[https://perma.cc/9NJX-3Q3F] (“To prosper over time, every company must not only deliver
financial performance, but also show how it makes a positive contribution to society.”); State Street
Introduces New Stakeholder Report, BUSINESSWIRE (May 20, 2020, 9:00 AM),
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20200520005483/en/State-Street-Introduces-NewStakeholder-Report [https://perma.cc/DRE3-QQR3] (linking State Street’s growth and strategy for
the year with its emphasis on corporate responsibility and Environmental, Social, and Governance
(“ESG”) principles).
70. TEDx Talks, TEDxPhilly - Jay Coen Gilbert - On Better Businesses, YOUTUBE, at 10:06–
10:18 (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mGnz-w9p5FU (“[S]ystems should exist to
serve society, and right now our capitalist system is not serving society; it’s serving shareholders.
And we can’t run around expecting different outcomes until we change the rules of the game.”); J.
Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware’s Public Benefit Corporation Law, 4
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 345, 345 (2014).
71. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization
Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1424 (1993); John F. Cogan, Some
Thoughts on the Business Roundtable’s Statement of Corporate Purpose, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Oct. 7, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/10/07/some-thoughts-on-thebusiness-roundtables-statement-of-corporate-purpose
[https://perma.cc/2GPE-TL6D]
(“Maximizing the resources society’s members have available to meet these responsibilities is best
achieved by maintaining the paramount duty of U.S. corporations to maximize shareholder
value.”).
72. See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 66 (arguing for reforms “premised on the idea that
stakeholder governance and ESG are in the best interests of shareholders”); Robert Goodyear
Murray, Money Talks, Constituents Walk: Pennsylvania’s Corporate Constituency Statute Can
Maximize Shareholders’ Wealth, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 629, 643 (2000) (explaining that Pennsylvania’s
Business Corporation Law establishes that stakeholder interests may be considered).
73. Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115 Cong. § 5 (2018). Europe has a variety of other
forms, most notably Germany’s codetermination model where employees elect half of the board,
but this oversimplified spectrum provided here is sufficient background to understand the contours
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outcomes generally maps onto partisan fault lines, where the right
believes in stricter shareholder primacy, 74 and the left argues for more
significant stakeholder consideration. 75 Importantly, though, this
debate is not just partisan or economic—corporate actors are highly
invested given that trillions of dollars of capital are put at risk should
the model of corporate purpose change. 76
This Note is not simply a survey of this range of outcomes but
rather is a normative description of how states can cut this “gordian
knot” by pulling from both ends of this spectrum to create a more
optimal corporate-governance model. 77 But first, it is important to
break down the advantages and disadvantages as analysts move from
shareholder primacy to stakeholder primacy to see why existing
solutions are less than ideal.
A. The Case for Strict Shareholder Primacy
In 1997, the Business Roundtable articulated the doctrine
advocated most cogently by Milton Friedman by explaining, “the
paramount duty of management and of boards of directors is to the
corporation’s stockholders.” 78 The Business Roundtable noted in the
same statement that shareholders and stakeholders are not always in
conflict, but requiring boards to balance their interests is “an
unworkable notion because it would leave the board with no criterion
for resolving conflicts between interests of stockholders and of other
of the American debate. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 445 (2001) (briefly describing German codetermination).
74. Cogan, supra note 71 (arguing strict shareholder primacy best allocates resources, saying
“[a]ttempts to placate progressive politicians will only encourage further efforts to use U.S.
corporations for their own social purposes”).
75. BERNIE SANDERS, supra note 49.
76. The Activist Investing Annual Review: The Seventh Annual Review of Trends in
INSIGHT
23–29
(2020),
Shareholder
Activism,
ACTIVIST
https://www.activistinsight.com/research/TheActivistInvesting_AnnualReview_2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V7ZM-HSZ9]. The top ten institutional investors collectively have over thirtyfour trillion dollars in assets under management, and operations of these underlying assets would
change dramatically if the existing tenets of corporation governance were modified. Tim Lemke,
The 10 Largest Investment Management Companies Worldwide, THE BALANCE (Nov. 5, 2021),
https://www.thebalance.com/which-firms-have-the-most-assets-under-management-4173923
[https://perma.cc/4MQJ-66YT].
77. See Peter Atkins, Kenton King & Marc Gerber, Stockholders Versus Stakeholders—
Cutting the Gordian Knot, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Aug. 24, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/08/24/stockholders-versus-stakeholders-cutting-thegordian-knot [https://perma.cc/84RF-35P7] (referring to director orientation as the “gordian knot”
due to the inability to solve the underlying issues); Wolf-George Ringe, Investor-Led Sustainability
in Corporate Governance 8–18 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., L. Working Paper No. 615, 2021)
(arguing that increasing investor power provides promise for promoting ESG values outside of any
regulatory involvement).
78. 1997 Business Roundtable Statement, supra note 43, at 3.
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stakeholders or among different groups of stakeholders.” 79 These
statements, and other assertions in favor of shareholder primacy,
generally follow three common arguments: (1) shareholder primacy
provides boards some orientation for decisionmaking when interests
between parties diverge, (2) shareholder value is the best proxy for
wider welfare maximization, and (3) corporations committed to “social
responsibility” misallocate resources. 80 These three pillars of
shareholder capitalism deserve attention in turn.
First, prioritizing shareholders provides a compass for boards of
directors that may otherwise confuse the corporate objective in making
decisions where interested parties have competing priorities. 81 A strict
shareholder primacy model asserts that directors must make decisions
to maximize shareholder wealth—full stop. 82 Of course, as most
advocates of shareholder primacy note, in order to succeed as a
corporation and maximize shareholder wealth, the corporation must
consider the stakeholders that are critical components to operating the
business. 83 But when a corporation is locked in a hostile takeover, the
interests of the shareholders and other constituencies often diverge, so
shareholder primacy advocates argue that boards must negotiate for
the best price as opposed to looking out for the future of employees,
suppliers, creditors, and other stakeholders. 84 Where there is
divergence, directors need to know what faction of stakeholders they
are to be loyal and careful toward—shareholder primacy provides this
clarity. They are to orient toward shareholders.
The second argument suggests that the competition for human
capital, supply, community buy-in, and other fundamental corporate
inputs ensures that corporations cannot leave nonshareholders
79. Id. at 3–4. Interestingly, while Friedman mentions potential trade-offs between different
groups of stakeholders, he makes no mention of potential trade-offs between different groups of
shareholders. Friedman, and others, think of shareholders as one indivisible concept. See, e.g.,
Friedman, supra note 27; Bainbridge, supra note 71.
80. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 27 (criticizing the “social responsibilities of business” for
encouraging executives to act in a manner not in the interest of the corporation’s shareholders);
Strine, supra note 31, at 767–68 (criticizing constituency statutes).
81. See Strine, supra note 31, at 767 (noting that allowing directors to promote the interests
of other constituencies does not ensure protection for those constituencies or the stockholders).
82. See id. at 765–68 (discussing how commentators rejecting shareholder primacy under
existing Delaware corporate law “ignore structural features of corporation law”); Millon, supra
note 23, at 1013–15 (describing two different types of shareholder primacy—one “radical” and the
other “traditional”).
83. Cogan, supra note 71 (“Mistreat any of these stakeholders and shareholder value will
decline. Competition from companies who take account of all of their stakeholders ensures this
outcome.”).
84. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986)
(holding that the board’s actions were motivated by interests other than the maximization of
shareholder profits and thus could be enjoined during a hostile takeover situation).
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completely behind. 85 As a result, in order to maximize shareholder
wealth, the corporation must consider stakeholders, so boards do not
need a legal requirement to consider these stakeholders. 86 Strict
shareholder primacy advocates go on to argue that maximizing
shareholder wealth is the best proxy for maximizing stakeholder
welfare. 87 Because shareholder primacy, in this model, increases the
size of the pie for all constituencies, nonshareholder interests are
advanced whereas any other model simply divvies up the existing pie,
or even shrinks the pie, without any added welfare. 88
The last argument for shareholder primacy is founded in agency
theory. 89 Because shareholders provide their own wealth to capitalize
corporations and own the companies as a result but do not manage
them, there is an agency cost ingrained in the corporate model. 90
Theoretically, these shareholders are investing in the corporation for
management to use these funds to produce value and thereby increase
the shareholders’ wealth. 91 Based on this model, corporations are well
suited to mix this capital with other inputs to create value through new
outputs. Proponents of shareholder primacy assert that corporations
are not well suited, however, to allocate resources to social or charitable
causes. 92 At best, this is an inefficient use of resources, as corporations
are no better at providing charity than their owners would be. 93 At
worst, this a complete misappropriation of the owners’ capital. 94

85. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 592 (2003) (arguing that contract law and regulation provide
better protection for nonshareholder constituencies than a “stakeholder model of corporate law”).
86. Bebchuk & Tallarita, Illusory Promise, supra note 1, at 97.
87. See Bainbridge, supra note 85, at 592 (explaining how a shareholder-focused model
“probably provides nonshareholder constituencies with more meaningful protections than would
the stakeholder model of corporate law”).
88. See Bebchuk & Tallarita, Will Corporations Deliver Value, supra note 1, manuscript at
13 (arguing that “increasing slack and underperformance . . . could reduce the pie available to
shareholders and stakeholders”). As businesses innovate to create shareholder value, the
argument goes, opportunities expand for communities, employees, and other stakeholders such
that the “size of the pie” or the amount of gross value increases. See Rock, supra note 3, at 5.
89. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON.
288, 288–89 (1980) (describing the efficiency of separating security ownership and control).
90. See id. at 291–92 (noting that diversified shareholders will be rationally apathetic to any
one firm’s performance and that management teams invest their “human capital” into the company
and the best “rental rates” for their services in the market).
91. Id. at 292.
92. Friedman, supra note 27 (arguing that charitable contributions, or “social
responsibilities,” are those of individuals, not of businesses).
93. Id.
94. See Bebchuk & Tallarita, Illusory Promise, supra note 1, at 171–73 (arguing that
expecting corporate leaders to address climate change would result in less resources for
organizations meant to address those issues and deprioritize important legal and regulatory work).
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While stakeholder capitalists, such as Lipton or former
Starbucks CEO Howard Shultz, disagree with these pillars of
shareholder primacy, much of the disagreement centers around the
creation of externalities when boards have such singular focus. 95 The
counterargument to shareholder primacy is that impacts to workers,
communities, and ecosystems are negative externalities that
corporations rationally will not internalize if their sole goal is profit
generation and shareholder wealth maximization. 96 No board would
protect the environment or pay workers a “living wage” if doing so
increases their costs and decreases firm value. Of course, there are some
moments where “shared value” can be created, and pulling these
externalities into the business can enhance shareholder value. 97 For
example, brands may promote green products in an effort to boost sales
to environmentally conscious consumers or invest in the community of
its headquarters to increase talent attraction and retention. When it is
in the corporation’s best pecuniary interest to maximize stakeholder
welfare, the decisionmaking process for the board is not complex. 98
Boards do, and should, look for moments where they can create shared
value, but these moments are not as common as the instances where
interests diverge, like in a takeover scenario. It is in these moments of
divergence where there must be a framework for directors to apply to
ensure they are making a decision that is not only value-creating but
also legal.
B. “May” and the Case for Permitting Stakeholder Consideration
The opportunity for corporations to consider stakeholders, or
“other constituencies,” varies by state, but some statutes generally
permit boards to consider the interests of a defined set of stakeholders

95. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating
a Fair and Sustainable American Economy: A Reply to Professor Rock, 76 BUS. LAW. 397, 410
(2021) (discussing how measuring value based only on shareholder wealth does not take into
account the full costs of externalities and creates “a collective incentive for more responsible
companies to be more callous to workers, consumers, creditors, the environment, and their
communities so they can compete”).
96. See Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not
Market Value, 2 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 247, 258 (2017) (describing how companies will “naturally drift
toward social indifference” if they are restricted in their scope of purpose).
97. See ALEX EDMANS, GROW THE PIE: HOW GREAT COMPANIES DELIVER BOTH PURPOSE AND
PROFIT 117–18 (2020) (proposing that companies award equity to workers in addition to (or in lieu
of) executives).
98. See Bebchuk & Tallarita, Illusory Promise, supra note 1, at 129 (describing how there is
no functional difference between stakeholderism and shareholder wealth maximization in win-win
situations).
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in addition to the short-term and long-term interests of shareholders. 99
Increasingly prevalent in the 1980s in response to the rise in hostile
takeovers, these “other constituency” statutes clearly run contrary to
strict shareholder primacy theory. 100
The crux of permissive stakeholder consideration suggests that
corporations have a larger role to play in society than simply returning
capital to their investors. 101 Corporations employ millions, contribute
positively to communities, support thousands of suppliers, and make
material decisions that affect environmental ecosystems. As such, when
considering these statutes as antitakeover mechanisms, it stands to
reason that a corporation should not be forced to accept a takeover bid
simply if the business is not performing as well as an activist investor
feels it could be. The arguments for permissive consideration of
stakeholders generally focus on the importance of stakeholders and the
failure of regulation to protect against corporate externalities.
In the first category, proponents of permissive constituency
statutes assert the importance of stakeholders such that any model that
emphatically neglects them is irrational and misplaced. 102 These
supporters contend that if boards can consider stakeholders,
99. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 65 (West 2021) (“[A] director may consider
the interests of the corporation’s employees, suppliers, creditors and customers, the economy of
the state, region and nation, community and societal considerations, and the long-term and shortterm interests of the corporation and its stockholders . . . .”); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b)
(McKinney 2021) (permitting consideration of long-term and short-term interests of shareholders
in addition to the effects of actions on “prospects for potential growth,” current employees, retired
employees, customers, creditors, and communities); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1715 (2021) (saying
“directors of a business corporation may, in considering the best interests of the corporation,
consider to the extent they deem appropriate” the effects of actions on any group affected, the
“short-term and long-term interests of the corporation,” and “all other pertinent factors” including
the personal “resources, intent and conduct” of anyone seeking to acquire control of the
corporation).
100. See Murray, supra note 72, at 629 (describing how Pennsylvania’s constituency statute
authorized the board to consider “employees, suppliers, and customers” when making decisions on
behalf of the corporation); Richard B. Tyler, Other Constituency Statutes, 59 MO. L. REV. 373, 375–
78 (1994) (explaining how “other constituency” statutes “reflect a public policy of encouraging
managers to consider the effects on groups in addition to shareholders in determining whether or
not a particular action is in the best interests of the corporation”).
101. See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 66 (“The prioritization of the wealth of shareholders at the
expense of employee wages and retirement benefits, with a concomitant loss of the Horatio Alger
dream, gave rise to the deepening inequality and populism that today threaten capitalism from
both the left and the right.”).
102. See Andrew Winston, Is the Business Roundtable Statement Just Empty Rhetoric?, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Aug. 30, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/08/is-the-business-roundtable-statement-justempty-rhetoric [https://perma.cc/V95L-ZBLW] (suggesting the “current shareholder-obsessed
system is not fit” to solve increasingly complex, global challenges that require systemic efforts and
cooperation); Wai Shun Wilson Leung, The Inadequacy of Shareholder Primacy: A Proposed
Corporate Regime That Recognizes Non-Shareholder Interests, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 587,
587 (1997) (arguing that as firms face increasingly competitive markets, employees and
communities inevitably get left behind).
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corporations will better serve their communities, employees, and the
environment. 103 Some analysts go further to assert that providing
boards more flexibility to consider more variables allows them to make
decisions with long-term value creation in mind versus short-term stock
price maximization. 104 Ultimately, this concept runs counter to the idea
that welfare is enhanced by shareholder wealth maximization—here,
supporters argue that such a proxy for greater welfare is not a sufficient
fit, so boards must be able consider stakeholders more directly. 105
There is also a regulatory component to permissive constituency
statutes. Milton Friedman often admonished dissenters of shareholder
primacy by saying corporations should do what they can within the
rules of the game to maximize value. 106 Critics of shareholder primacy
have often argued, however, that because the rules of the game do not
support the welfare of certain stakeholders, corporate law must step in
as a stopgap for regulatory failure. 107 In short, proponents of permissive
constituency consideration are hoping boards will cure ills that
legislative or regulatory bodies have failed to sufficiently address. 108
Maybe counterintuitively, some analysts support these permissive
statutes in an effort to prevent more drastic regulatory measures. 109
Still, proponents of these statutes analyze their importance through a
regulatory lens even if both sides see the issue conversely. 110

103. See Stout, supra note 33, at 10–12 (“Indeed, decently satisfying several sometimescompeting objectives, rather than trying to ‘maximize’ one, is the rule and not the exception in
human affairs.”).
104. See Lipton, supra note 66 (arguing that directors should commit to a “New Paradigm”
where they flexibly support shareholders and stakeholders with an eye toward long-term strategy
in order to make capitalism more sustainable).
105. See Blair, supra note 3, at 15–16 (explaining how a commitment to maximizing
shareholder value partially led to the 2008 financial crisis).
106. Friedman, supra note 27 (“[T]here is one and only one social responsibility of business—
to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays
within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition without
deception or fraud.”).
107. See, e.g., Ray Dalio, Why and How Capitalism Needs to Be Reformed, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 13, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/10/13/why-and-howcapitalism-needs-to-be-reformed [https://perma.cc/W4BA-5N3C].
108. See Rock, supra note 3 (suggesting legislative inaction has spurred ideas for privatesector solutions); David J. Berger, In Search of Lost Time: What if Delaware Had Not Adopted
Shareholder Primacy?, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES 31–33 (Steven Davidoff
Solomon & Randall Stuart Thomas eds., 2019) (discussing the growing power of corporations).
109. See Rock, supra note 3, at 4 (explaining how ideas such as Lipton’s “New Paradigm” and
other private sector initiatives stemmed from “frustration with legislative inaction and fear of
radical future regulation”).
110. See Winston, supra note 102 (“In fact, our inability to confront society’s most pressing
problems goes beyond over-reliance on shareholder value – a relatively new idea – which may be
more a symptom of our real problem than its actual cause.”).
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Like strict shareholder primacy, counterarguments abound for
permissive stakeholder theory. Opponents point to the uncertainty
created when there is not a pecking order of interests. 111 By permitting
boards to consider a wide range of interests that often diverge, directors
have no direction on how to uphold their duties to the corporation. 112
Even worse, providing no criteria for decisionmaking may increase
board entrenchment if boards can fashion defenses with a variety of adhoc stakeholder-support arguments. 113 Models that do not provide
certainty decrease board accountability, which likely diminishes longterm shareholder wealth and may even limit long-term stakeholder
welfare. 114
On the other hand, proponents calling for required stakeholder
consideration argue that merely permitting boards to consider
stakeholder interests does not go far enough. 115 For example, some
believe that boards will ignore stakeholders due to economic selfinterest if they are not required to consider them. 116 Others suggest that
the externalities created by the strict shareholder primacy of the last
four decades would not be internalized by boards simply considering

111. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel & Roberto Tallarita, For Whom Corporate Leaders
Bargain,
94 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming
2021)
(manuscript
at
48–50),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3677155
[https://perma.cc/Z8WL-EE8P]
(stating that permissive statutes may be interpreted as prioritizing stakeholder interests or taking
them into account “only to the extent that doing so would serve shareholder value”); see also
Patrick D. Daugherty, Paul D. Broude, Megan A. Odroniec, John K. Wilson & John J. Wolfel, The
FOLEY
&
LARDNER
LLP
(Nov.
2019),
Purpose
of
a
Corporation,
https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2019/11/the-purpose-of-a-corporation
[https://perma.cc/DC36-2W2X] (“We surmise that the current debate may well result in a more
challenging role for boards of directors, which could be charged with balancing the oft-competing
interests between stockholders and other constituencies (and, for that matter, the oft-competing
interests among the other constituencies).”).
112. See Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Corporation Reborn: From Shareholder
Primacy to Shared Governance, 61 B.C. L. REV. 2419, 2442 (2020) (“The real problem with
stakeholder theory is that it is not, at least at present, a real theory of corporate governance.
Stakeholder theory lacks a model for allocating governance rights and responsibilities among the
participants.”).
113. Leung, supra note 102, at 618.
114. See Bainbridge, supra note 71, at 1433 (walking through possible uncertainties and the
effects on the cost of equity capital and nonshareholder constituencies).
115. See Lenore Palladino & Kristina Karlsson, Towards Accountable Capitalism: Remaking
Corporate Law Through Stakeholder Governance, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb.
11, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/11/towards-accountable-capitalism-remakingcorporate-law-through-stakeholder-governance [https://perma.cc/TFG4-UNUP] (describing the
rationale of mandatory stakeholder consideration).
116. See, e.g., Gary von Stange, Note, Corporate Social Responsibility Through Constituency
Statutes: Legend or Lie?, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 461, 490 (1994) (suggesting that permissive
constituency statutes will likely fail to accomplish corporate social responsibility if consideration
for nonshareholder constituencies is not expressly mandated).
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stakeholder interests—the law must go further. 117 Because permissive
consideration of shareholders and stakeholders is seemingly the middle
ground, there are arguments both that these constituency statutes
overstep—moving too far from shareholder primacy—and that they do
not go far enough.
C. “Must” and the Case for Requiring Stakeholder Consideration
For decades, Connecticut stood as the only state that required
directors to consider the interests of “other constituencies” in
determining the best interests of the corporation. 118 In 2010,
Connecticut passed updated legislation and fell in line with the
majority of other states that simply permit, but do not require, such
consideration. 119 Even though there are now zero states that require
consideration of other constituencies’ interests, politicians and
commentators alike still argue the necessity of such a requirement. 120
Support for such a position has two foundational ideas: (1) proponents
simply believe stakeholder interests are more important than
shareholder interests, and (2) proponents fundamentally disagree with
activist investing that strips corporations of their assets to enrich
shareholders and impoverish other constituencies. 121 As a result of
these core beliefs, proponents believe a corporate-law structure that
does not require boards to serve nonshareholder interests will never go
far enough. 122
Because the incentives of directors encourage boards to
maximize wealth, proponents of requiring consideration of other
constituencies believe stakeholders will always be left behind by
wealth-maximizing managers unless corporate law steps in. 123 Many
117. See Ewan McGaughey, Corporate Law Should Embrace Putting Workers on Boards: The
Evidence Is Behind Them, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Sept. 17, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/09/17/corporate-law-should-embrace-putting-workers-onboards-the-evidence-is-behind-them [https://perma.cc/X47Z-D77M].
118. Nathan E. Standley, Note, Lessons Learned from the Capitulation of the Constituency
Statute, 4 ELON L. REV. 209, 215–16 (2012).
119. Connecticut Updates Business Corporation Act; Clarifies Director Obligations,
Shareholder
Rights,
DAY
PITNEY
LLP
(May
17,
2010),
https://www.daypitney.com/~/media/files/insights/publications/2010/05/connecticut-updatesbusiness-corporation-act-cla__/files/dp316pdf/fileattachment/dp_316.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8BMSQ6L].
120. Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115 Cong. § 5 (2018).
121. Donna Borak & David Benoit, Democrats Take Aim at Activist Investors, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 17, 2016, 5:51 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/democrats-take-aim-at-activist-investors1458251491 [https://perma.cc/F8X9-W2DQ].
122. BERNIE SANDERS, supra note 49.
123. Cf. William T. Allen & Leo E. Strine, Jr., When the Existing Economic Order Deserves a
Champion: The Enduring Relevance of Martin Lipton’s Vision of the Corporate Law, 60 BUS. LAW.
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point to other countries’ corporate law structures in arguing that
requiring stakeholder participation, and therefore consideration, is not
extreme. 124 For example, some countries mandate labor representation
on boards to be able to advocate for their interests at the highest
level. 125
Those that believe the current structure does not sufficiently
support stakeholders can point to empirical research conducted by the
Diligent Institute, which found ninety-two percent of directors were
satisfied with their corporation’s success in meeting stakeholder
interests. 126 While the directors may be satisfied, only thirteen percent
of stakeholders believe corporate communications are consistent with
corporate action, 127 and this gap suggests the mechanism for promoting
stakeholder interests is breaking down. Under this analysis,
proponents believe corporate law must go a step further than simply
permitting boards to consider nonshareholder interests.
Of course, a model that is so far afield from the norms of
shareholder primacy will have plenty of detractors. The two main
sources of contention are rooted in theory and practical application.
Agency costs persist since the owners of the corporation—the
shareholders—do not actively manage decisionmaking. 128 If boards are
not only permitted to ignore the interests of the principal—in this case
the shareholders—but required to do so, the model amplifies agency
costs. 129 As a result, the gap between the owners and managers gets
1383, 1396 (2005) (discussing how executive compensation provides natural incentives for
maximizing shareholder wealth).
124. See Palladino & Karlsson, supra note 115 (arguing that “Europe shows us that there are
many ways a stakeholder model can be implemented”).
125. See Susan R. Holmberg, Workers on Corporate Boards? Germany’s Had Them for Decades,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/06/opinion/warren-workersboards.html [https://perma.cc/Z5GR-N9VB] (discussing Germany’s longstanding system of “codetermination,” which requires workers in large companies to elect up to half of the supervisory
board members).
126. DILIGENT INSTITUTE, STAKEHOLDERS TAKE CENTER STAGE: DIRECTOR VIEWS ON
PRIORITIES & SOCIETY (2019), http://view.ceros.com/diligent-corp/stakeholder-report/p/1
[https://perma.cc/BSB8-HJ7Q].
127. KKS ADVISORS, COVID-19 AND INEQUALITY: A TEST OF CORPORATE PURPOSE 27 (2020),
https://c6a26163-5098-4e74-89da9f6c9cc2e20c.filesusr.com/ugd/f64551_a55c15bb348f444982bfd28a030feb3c.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D6HL-VH95].
128. See Fama, supra note 89, at 291–93 (outlining corporations’ management tiers in relation
to shareholders).
129. See Milton Ezrati, Senator Warren’s Accountable Capitalism Bill Has Big Problems,
FORBES (Feb. 5, 2019, 5:34 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/miltonezrati/2019/02/05/senatorwarrens-accountable-capitalism-bill-has-big-problems [https://perma.cc/9JJU-SF6F] (arguing
that even requiring consideration of parties other than shareholders poses problems to managers
and directors); Bebchuk & Tallarita, Illusory Promise, supra note 1, at 115 (“[T]he task that
stakeholdersim assigns to corporate leaders is Herculean.”).
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larger, and a host of unintended consequences are all but assured. 130
For example, cost of capital will inevitably increase if investors feel less
confident that directors will protect their interests in value
maximization. 131 Thus, if stakeholder interests are placed ahead of
shareholder interests, corporations may not create the economic value
they otherwise would, which not only harms shareholder wealth but
may also harms stakeholder welfare. 132
There are also practical concerns with placing multiple
stakeholders ahead of shareholders. In addition to increasing agency
costs, this would also inflame concerns that boards will have no
direction, which could grind productivity to a halt. 133 With shareholders
de-prioritized compared to other constituencies, the board still has a
number of competing interests to consider in making any decision and
no way of knowing what “serves the corporation best” if interests
diverge. As a result, boards will be hesitant to make decisions fearful
they are not fulfilling their duty to the corporation, which ultimately
harms the firm, its shareholders, and its stakeholders.
In analyzing the spectrum of existing options, it becomes
increasingly clear that inherent concerns plague each paradigm.
Opponents of shareholder primacy are right to highlight corporate
failings and externalities created by focusing solely on profit
maximization but are wrong to wish away the importance of certainty,
accountability, and economic viability. Fortunately, an existing model
lurks beneath the obvious policy options that can be supercharged to
make corporations more certain, accountable, and purposeful to
maximize societal welfare without sacrificing shareholder wealth.

130. Ezrati, supra note 129.
131. See Bainbridge, supra note 71, at 1433 (explaining that if rates of return do not meet
investor expectations, investors will divest stock and change investments, ultimately increasing
the cost of equity capital). Some firms, however, are now contracting for more favorable borrowing
rates based on meeting certain ESG goals. See Dawn Lim, BlackRock Must Hit ESG Targets or
7,
2021,
12:30
AM),
Pay
More
to
Borrow
Money,
WALL ST. J. (Apr.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/blackrock-must-hit-esg-targets-or-pay-more-to-borrow-money11617769833 [https://perma.cc/BR34-CVLJ] (explaining how BlackRock created a financing deal
that “links its lending costs for a $4.4 billion credit facility to its ability to achieve certain goals,
like meeting targets for women in senior leadership and Black and Latino employees in its
workforce”).
132. See Bebchuk & Tallarita, Illusory Promise, supra note 1, at 120 (stakeholderism
inevitably results in opportunities to provide benefits to stakeholders that will “come at the
expense of shareholders”).
133. Denise Kuprionis, Will Warren’s Accountable Capitalism Act Help? The Answer Is No.,
L.
SCH.
F.
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
(Sept.
10,
2018),
HARV.
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/09/10/will-warrens-accountable-capitalism-act-help-theanswer-is-no [https://perma.cc/5X6R-RH53].
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III. DYNAMIC CORPORATE PURPOSE
A state’s role in corporate law should be relatively simple: set
the rules to maximize welfare and remove uncertainty such that players
in the game react legally, appropriately, and expectedly. 134 Of course,
this role is not that simple, but the purpose debate at the heart of
corporate law has focused on stagnant poles that have clear priorities
and clear disadvantages. 135 But why does “corporate purpose” have to
be a one-size-fits-all proposition? 136 A holding company for oil and gas
projects has significantly different objectives—and different potential
benefits to society—than an environmentally conscious shirt retailer, so
why must these corporations be held to the same centralized corporate
purpose? 137 Actually, Delaware and thirty-six other states have already
answered these questions by saying: they do not. 138 By providing a path
to incorporate as PBCs, Delaware has asserted that corporations do not
have to have the same corporate purpose—some corporations must
orient only toward shareholders, while others advance the interests of
stakeholders alongside shareholders. 139
The State of Delaware, or any state for that matter, should look
to use the logic of the PBC model to leverage the advantages of
shareholder primacy while also advancing conscious capitalism through

134. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, 26 REGUL.
26, 27–28 (2003) (explaining state law’s role in defining the rights of shareholders and the powers
of directors).
135. See Edward Waitzer, Dynamic Governance: Rethinking the Purpose of the Corporation,
NACD BOARDTALK (Mar. 6, 2018), https://blog.nacdonline.org/posts/rethinking-the-corporation
[https://perma.cc/KU67-LDJG] (“What has become clear is that there is no ‘right’ corporate
governance model. Governance is highly contextual, and is dependent on what a particular
company does, its ownership structure, and the markets and political frameworks in which it
operates.”).
136. See Leon Yehuda Anidjar, The Pluralist Foundations of Corporate Governance 17 (Sept.
13,
2021)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3750857
[https://perma.cc/5XF6-65XC]
(“[A]dherence to ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach prevents corporate law from meeting the challenge of
complexity by crafting tailor-made law following a firm-specific perspective.”); see also Zohar
Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and Governance, 117
COLUM. L. REV. 767, 826 (2017) (“[T]he inescapable tradeoff between principal costs and agent
costs cautions against . . . one-size-fits-all regulations.”).
137. See Anidjar, supra note 136, at 38–39 (“[C]orporate law scholars have not considered the
possibility that every company has its own unique purpose . . . . For example, . . . a company whose
principal activity is limited to holding other several companies has a strikingly different objective
from one whose main production activity is highly dependent on the capital contribution of its
employees and managers.”).
138. See Littenberg et al., supra note 54 (describing how directors of different PBCs have
different duties based on their varied enumerated benefits).
139. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361–68 (2021).
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the essence of stakeholder governance. 140 States do not need to formally
settle the debate by picking one concept or the other; states can instead
leverage market power to optimize corporate performance through a
concept known as dynamic corporate purpose. 141 Here, corporations
themselves set their own purpose, which allows prioritized parties to be
supported more specifically and allows the state to reform its legal
structure to reflect actual corporate behavior. 142 In short, this will bring
purpose back to corporate purpose. 143
Dynamic corporate purpose permits corporations to advance
wider societal goals without sacrificing board accountability or creating
a disconnect between agents and principals. 144 While there is a risk this
solution may fall short of its academic promise, concerns are cabined by
market forces which should regulate the legal structure better than the
current centralized framework. 145 By decentralizing corporate purpose,
140. Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 387, 394 n.21, 509 (2001) (“Delaware is not the only state to be
continually revising its corporation code: other states invariably follow suit, revising their codes to
follow Delaware’s innovations . . . .”).
141. See Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 68, at 725–26 (describing how “the institutional
ownership of corporate equity increased tenfold, from 6.1% to 65%” from 1950 to 2017). As
institutional investors have gained power through vote concentration, shareholders as a class have
begun to exert more pressure on firms to reform internal corporate-governance mechanisms. See
Lucian Bebchuk, Scott Hirst & June Rhee, Towards the Declassification of S&P 500 Boards, 3
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 157, 175 (2013) (explaining how the Shareholder Rights Project is “contributing
to moving a substantial number of S&P 500 companies toward arrangements that are more
consistent with the preferences of institutional investors”); see also Anidjar, supra note 136, at 19
(citing Jennifer G. Hill, Good Activist/Bad Activist: The Rise of International Stewardship Codes,
41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 497, 503–06 (2018)) (“[I]ncreased engagement of institutional investors—
such as pension funds and insurance companies—does [have] the potential to improve corporate
decision-making, and provides protection against excessive risk-taking.”).
142. States required a specific corporate purpose when they began incorporating businesses.
See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 112, at 2437 n.106 (citing Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S.
517, 554–55 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting in part) (“At first, corporations could be formed under
the general laws only for a limited number of purposes . . . .”)).
143. Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Should Corporations Have a Purpose?, 99 TEX.
L. REV. 1309, 1312 (2021) (describing how effective purpose “enables corporate participants to
formalize their goals and priorities, which can include not just the pursuit of profits, but the
incorporation of operational constraints, stakeholder values, and social impact”).
144. See Larry Fink, A Fundamental Reshaping of Finance, BLACKROCK,
https://www.blackrock.com/hk/en/larry-fink-ceo-letter
(last
visited
Oct.
31,
2021)
[https://perma.cc/JPE5-542B] (“As I have written in past letters, a company cannot achieve longterm profits without embracing purpose and considering the needs of a broad range of
stakeholders.”).
145. See Paul Crampton, Striking the Right Balance Between Competition and Regulation: The
Key Is Learning from Our Mistakes, ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV. 2–3 (Oct. 17, 2002),
https://www.oecd.org/regreform/2503205.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BWE-3SCK] (explaining the
instances when competition is superior to regulation). Regulation is needed when there is a market
failure or when the state is required to step in to advance the “public interest.” Id. at 4. While some
will argue there is a market failure in corporate law, the problem is better explained as regulatoryscheme failure. While proponents of stakeholder theory argue reform is needed to advance the

2022]

DYNAMIC CORPORATE PURPOSE

351

Delaware can promote societal interests without sacrificing the
economic advantages of shareholder primacy.
A. Establishing Dynamic Corporate Purpose Through the DGCL
Because the tenets of strict shareholder primacy are baked into
existing case law in Delaware, establishing dynamic purpose requires
the legislature to amend the DGCL. 146 The simplest reform would be to
amend subchapter XV on Public Benefit Corporations to eliminate
PBCs and apply the concept to all corporations. 147 To avoid market
uncertainty, dynamic corporate purpose would ask a corporation to list
two items in its articles of incorporation: (1) the corporation’s public
benefit purpose statement 148 and (2) the parties materially affected by
the corporation’s enumerated purpose. 149
Practically, this approach would require each corporation to set
its own purpose statement and report progress against any materially
affected parties to this purpose. 150 Here, directors would have a
fiduciary duty to be careful and loyal to the corporate purpose, so
directors of different organizations could be oriented toward different
parties. To uphold their fiduciary duties, directors would need to use
their business judgment to determine how certain decisions would
advance the corporation’s enumerated purpose, and investors would
buy into the organization with a sense of which parties will be
prioritized.

public interest, the delicate balance in corporate law should be respected and instead calls for a
decentralized approach that more dynamically advances varied interests.
146. Strine, supra note 31, at 765–68. Even if shareholder primacy is just a norm in the state
of Delaware, a core tenet of dynamic corporate purpose is market and director certainty, so
legislation provides the best avenue for reform. See Blair, supra note 3, at 10 (suggesting
shareholder primacy is simply a norm).
147. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361–68 (2021). For example, a corporation could state in its
charter that “the purpose of the corporation is to engage in any lawful activity for which a
corporation may be organized in Delaware for the benefit of shareholders.” An alternative
approach would be to state that “the purpose of the corporation is to support shareholders and the
community of Eastern North Carolina through lawful activities for which a corporation may be
organized in the state.”
148. For example, existing PBC Lemonade, Inc. says its public benefit purpose is to “deliver
insurance products where charitable giving is a core feature, for the benefit of communities and
their common causes.” Lemonade, Inc., Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation 2
(2019).
149. Firms could elect to not list parties that will be equivalent to shareholders in the pecking
order, but that would leave the decision as to who is “materially affected” up to judges in litigation.
150. See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 143, at 1313 (“To be functional, a corporate purpose
must both provide concrete guidance for the corporation’s operations, priorities, or goals and
meaningfully constrain corporate action.”).
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Delaware would need to amend sections 361 through 368 of the
DGCL to apply the logic of PBCs to all corporations. 151 The state would
require a corporation’s certificate of incorporation to “identify within its
statement of business or purpose pursuant to [section] 102(a)(3) of this
title one or more specific public benefits to be promoted by the
corporation.” 152 Further, it would require corporations to “be managed
in a manner that balances the stockholders’ pecuniary interests, the
best interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s purpose,
and any benefits identified in its certificate of incorporation.” 153 Any
stock certificate would need to clearly state the enumerated purpose of
the corporation with notice conspicuously given. 154 Unlike PBCs,
though, corporations could elect their enumerated benefit be wholly for
shareholders. 155 So, directors will owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders
and any other parties materially affected by the stated corporate
purpose, and the state will require biennial reporting as to progress in
supporting the enumerated benefits identified in the certificate of
incorporation. 156
For PBCs, the DGCL presently requires reporting overall
objectives, standards for measuring progress, and objective information
to assess success in promoting the enumerated objectives. 157 These
reporting requirements are based on the stated public benefit selected
by the PBC, but in an environment of dynamic corporate purpose, these
reporting requirements would apply to all corporations. 158 This reform
takes the successful model of PBCs but flips the regime from an opt-in
to an opt-out concept, which should exert more pressure on corporations

151. This would require amending section 361 to say “[t]his subchapter applies to all
corporations” and striking language that refers to public benefit corporations. See tit. 8, § 361.
152. tit. 8, § 362(a).
153. See tit. 8, §§ 361–68 (This language mirrors the existing language in section 362.).
154. See tit. 8, § 364 (PBCs issuing stock certificates must “note conspicuously that the
corporation is a” PBC.).
155. The logic here is that maintaining economic viability through incorporation is a sufficient
“public benefit,” and firms that are not equipped, or do not wish, to report against progress toward
other benefits should not be expected to do so.
156. See Littenberg et al., supra note 54 (describing reporting requirements); tit. 8, §§ 365–66
(explaining the duties of PBC directors and the periodic statements PBCs must make to their
shareholders).
157. Littenberg et al., supra note 54.
158. These reporting requirements are not too onerous for startups as startups can simply opt
for shareholder primacy and report against financial performance to shareholders just like
traditional corporations operate today. Existing corporations in the state should not be required
to amend their charters and could be presumed to prioritize shareholders unless otherwise agreed
to by shareholders.

2022]

DYNAMIC CORPORATE PURPOSE

353

to provide a reportable benefit to some prioritized stakeholder(s). 159 As
such, the state should give corporations a grace period of two or more
years to settle on a corporate purpose for shareholder approval. 160
Some points of confirmation are necessary. The law would not
require corporations to be managed for the interests of stakeholders if
they do not wish to be—such corporations could simply state the benefit
of the firm is to maximize economic viability. 161 Directors would not be
permitted to wholly ignore shareholders’ pecuniary interests either—
just like fiduciaries of PBCs cannot do so today. 162 As a result, corporate
purpose will be managed by the will of investors and the subsequent
allocation of resources. 163 If a firm is too committed to shareholder
wealth maximization and the business externalizes costs to the point of
societal harm, investors can force a change in corporate purpose, while
firms that fail to generate a reasonable return for shareholders could
see investors force more shareholder focus. 164 Dynamic corporate
purpose leverages the market’s power to regulate corporate behavior
and relies on shareholders exiting or voting as faithful mechanisms to
maintain order. 165 As seen by Engine No. 1 winning a proxy battle over
159. Currently, consumers and investors do not expect firms to provide an explicit purpose. By
reforming the mechanism for laying out a corporate purpose, investors, consumers, employees, and
other stakeholders may exit a firm with a purpose that they see as illegitimate or insignificant.
160. With an extended timeline, managers can weigh their options and coordinate with the
market to determine an optimal director orientation. If shareholders do not approve any additional
corporate purpose—that is, they do not want to add any prioritized party to report progress
toward—they will then tacitly approve a purpose solely dedicated to shareholder wealth
maximization. Of course, this purpose can change as the corporation grows or evolves.
161. Professor Mark Roe has an interesting article that suggests firms with more market
power have more profit margin to dedicate to the “costly” pursuit of purpose. Here, you could
envision firms competing not only based on their culture for employees or on their product/service
for customers but also on their corporate purpose. This could increase pressure on otherwise
powerful, quasi-monopolistic firms. See generally Mark J. Roe, Corporate Purpose and Corporate
Competition 2 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., L. Working Paper No. 601, 2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3817788 [https://perma.cc/VR27-3B64].
162. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365(a) (2021).
163. This admittedly puts some pressure on institutional investors to put their money where
their mouth is. Under this model, BlackRock, State Street, and others should inevitably require
some stakeholder orientation based on their previous public remarks. Similarly, every CEO who
is a part of the Business Roundtable would face added pressure to reform their company’s
corporate purpose statement in some way.
164. Compare FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 35–36 (1991) (arguing that the corporate purpose at the time of any given deal is
binding between the corporation and the rights holders, so changing corporate purpose “midstream” raises a complaint for breach of contract), with Yosifon, supra note 36, at 498 (arguing
that the power to amend the corporate charter is “expansive” and that Delaware’s PBC statute
permits an ordinary Delaware corporation to amend its charter to become a PBC).
165. See Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1277
& n.63 (1982) (citing ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE
IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS AND STATES (1970)) (discussing shareholders’ choice to either leave a
stock or expend extensive resources to form a voting bloc); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
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behemoth ExxonMobil, current market factors can exert pressure on
corporations to enact change in strategy and stakeholder
consideration. 166 Dynamic corporate purpose just makes this easier.
Like with PBCs, enumerated benefits under dynamic corporate
purpose should also alter Revlon duties such that directors will be
offered an antitakeover mechanism. 167 If a corporation’s purpose
prioritizes shareholders and employees, and directors reasonably
believe a buyer will impinge on the firm’s ability to support employees,
directors will not be required to accept the bid even if it is economically
superior (for shareholders) to another bid. 168 Instead, they will be
expected to continue to advance the interests that they report progress
against—to shareholders and employees. This should assuage some
concerns over asset-stripping activist investors. While some may argue
this antitakeover mechanism will increase entrenchment, there are
incentives against orienting toward too many stakeholders, so directors
must weigh their options proactively. 169 This tension should limit
unnecessary entrenchment and could even lead to takeovers based on
non-pecuniary grounds if the corporation is not executing toward its
over-extended corporate purpose. 170

Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 395–99 (1983) (arguing that shareholders
“express views by buying and selling shares”); see also Fisch & Solomon, supra note 143, at 1340–
41 (“As Citizens United recognized, ‘the procedures of corporate democracy’ allow corporate
participants to coordinate their expectations and impose those expectations on corporate decision
makers.”) (citing Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 361–62 (2010)).
166. See Matt Phillips, Exxon’s Board Defeat Signals the Rise of Social-Good Activists, N.Y.
TIMES (June 9, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/09/business/exxon-mobil-engine-no1activist.html [https://perma.cc/4U3E-C2LF].
167. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986);
Strine, supra note 59, at 245 (stating that the Delaware statute establishing PBCs “makes clear
that the Revlon doctrine does not apply to benefit corporations”); Frederick H. Alexander,
Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Frank R. Martin & Norman M. Monhait, M&A Under Delaware’s Public
Benefit Corporation Statute: A Hypothetical Tour, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 255, 270 (2014) (suggesting
the Revlon analysis is different for PBCs than for traditional corporations).
168. Strine, supra note 95, at 428 (“The PBC model builds on the business judgment rule model
by protecting the board from a challenge to a decision that it makes that requires it to balance the
interests of various stakeholders, including in a sale of the corporation.”). Proctor & Gamble, for
example, directs the board in their corporate bylaws to orient towards employees but this is simply
permissive. Bebchuk & Tallarita, Will Corporations Deliver Value, supra note 1, manuscript at 41.
169. Directors would want to avoid having to report progress towards too many stakeholders
based on time and resource constraints and an increase in the risk of litigation. See Bebchuk &
Tallarita, Will Corporations Deliver Value, supra note 1, manuscript at 30 (using Amazon as an
example of how shareholders submit proposals to ask for clarity on how management will
implement “stakeholderist principles”). Even more shareholder proposals requesting reports
would be expected from firms that aim to support too many stakeholders.
170. Cf. Robert Eccles, Aeisha Mastagni & Kirsty Jenkinson, An Introduction to Activist
L.
SCH.
F.
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
(Mar.
1,
2021),
Stewardship,
HARV.
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/03/01/an-introduction-to-activist-stewardship
[https://perma.cc/RW9R-G3BN] (calling for “activist stewardship,” where firms would promote
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Lastly, the difference between the current opportunity for
existing corporations to opt into becoming PBCs versus mandating that
firms select prioritized parties is subtle but significant. 171 Currently,
corporations can hide behind shareholder primacy in ways they could
not under dynamic purpose—we see this when corporations support one
class of stakeholders in the press but then ignore these stakeholders in
the boardroom. 172 Institutional investors are not expected to exit
investments in traditional, shareholder-focused corporations because
the alternative market simply is not large enough to satisfy
institutional investors’ own fiduciary responsibilities. 173 With dynamic
corporate purpose, firms will be expected—by consumers, employees,
and investors—to memorialize their public-relations-driven objectives
in the essence of their corporate purpose. 174 This mechanism will
decrease the divide between what organizations state publicly and how
they act privately, which should increase corporate efficiency and
decrease bad behavior. 175
ESG initiatives through traditional methods of activism as opposed to through simple private
cajoling).
171. Fisch & Solomon, supra note 143, at 1341 (“Purpose provides a public-facing mechanism
that expands the scope of those who can hold the corporation accountable.”).
172. Johnson & Johnson presents one example of this dynamic. One week after the Business
Roundtable released its refined corporate purpose statement a judge in Oklahoma ordered
Johnson & Johnson to pay $572 million for its role in fueling the opioid epidemic. Jan Hoffman,
Johnson & Johnson Ordered to Pay $572 Million in Landmark Opioid Trial, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/26/health/oklahoma-opioids-johnson-and-johnson.html
[https://perma.cc/BUN4-8YN9]. Johnson & Johnson is known for its “credo” that it puts patients,
doctors, and nurses first, and its CEO signed the Business Roundtable statement desiring a
greater corporate purpose. Chevron presents another example as they have argued, after some
shareholder pressure, that they have a long track record of supporting the interests of stakeholders
and acting sustainably. Bebchuk & Tallarita, Will Corporations Deliver Value, supra note 1,
manuscript at 39.
173. See Christopher Geczy, Jessica S. Jeffers, David K. Musto & Anne M. Tucker,
Institutional Investing When Shareholders Are Not Supreme, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 73, 79–90 (2015)
(explaining the fiduciary duties of institutional investors).
174. See Strine, supra note 95, at 429 (discussing the PBC model, Strine argues that
“stockholder advocates ignore that undeniable potency of capital and product markets and the way
they have tilted corporate governance.”); see also John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at
the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 549
(2016) (explaining that hedge funds have embraced activism because the costs and potential
benefits of shareholder activism have decreased and increased, respectively).
175. One example of this behavior can be seen by the largest banks publicly claiming to
support stakeholders by signing the Business Roundtable’s Statement but failing to react to
shareholder proposals that would turn these corporations into PBCs. See Shareholder Advocacy
for the 2021 Proxy Season, HARRINGTON INVS., INC., http://www.harringtoninvestments.com/43792 (last visited Oct. 8, 2021) [https://perma.cc/2LZU-HH5J] (documenting this phenomenon for
several large, publicly traded corporations); see also Patricia Kowsmann & Ken Brown, Fired
Executive Says Deutsche Bank’s DWS Overstated Sustainable-Investing Efforts, WALL ST. J. (Aug.
1, 2021, 5:33 AM) https://www.wsj.com/articles/fired-executive-says-deutsche-banks-dwsoverstated-sustainable-investing-efforts-11627810380 [https://perma.cc/LKK9-JKPT] (describing
how Deutsche Bank publicly stated that ESG was at the heart of operation, but, in reality, the
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B. Advantages of Drawing from Shareholder Primacy
Dynamic corporate purpose keeps directors accountable to clear
objectives based on defined measurements, maintains clarity of
direction by limiting the purview of directors, increases certainty for
investors, and limits agency concerns since the corporate purpose is
well known throughout the relationship between principal and agent.
This construct permits corporations to support specific societal
positions without removing methods of accountability. Here, directors
have to report against enumerated objectives with clear measurements
for success. 176 As a result, directors cannot assert post-hoc that they
were attempting to support some previously unidentified objective in an
attempt to entrench themselves or to pursue other motivations. 177
Directors will be free to support the stakeholders that investors direct
them to definitively support, but such action will be constrained by the
will of the shareholders. 178
With a clear purpose statement, directors will have the clarity
of direction desired by proponents of shareholder primacy. 179 While
these advocates will certainly argue that directors cannot possibly be
expected to serve a purpose that materially affects multiple parties, 180
Professor Stout was correct when she argued that the concept of a single
“shareholder value” is, at best, an oversimplification and, at worst, a
complete fiction. 181 That said, promoting a single concept ensures that
directors are all acting with loyalty toward the same thing—here,
directors are expected to be loyal to the corporation through the
corporation’s enumerated purpose. The business judgment rule already
firm struggled to implement an actual strategy). This mechanism will inevitably put more pressure
on institutional investors, too, who also tout stakeholderism in the press.
176. See, e.g., PATAGONIA WORKS, ANNUAL BENEFIT CORPORATION REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2019,
at
24–27
(2019),
https://www.patagonia.com/on/demandware.static/-/Library-SitesPatagoniaShared/default/dwf14ad70c/PDF-US/PAT_2019_BCorp_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TRH6-EABV] (providing an example of the comprehensiveness of PBC
reporting).
177. See Alexander et al., supra note 168, at 270–71 (discussing the difficulty courts would
have in second-guessing director judgment about tradeoffs between shareholder wealth
maximization at sale and pursuit of enumerated public benefits).
178. Opponents to shareholder primacy will undoubtedly argue this point, but this design
feature ensures directors’ accountability to their principals. Opponents cannot wish away the
shareholders’ role as owner.
179. See Cogan, supra note 71 (“The [Business Roundtable]’s proposed standard of multiple
masters and numerous objectives is a recipe for a lack of corporate accountability.”).
180. See Bebchuk & Tallarita, Illusory Promise, supra note 1, at 120 (arguing “potential tradeoffs between shareholders and stakeholders are ubiquitous”).
181. Stout, supra note 33, at 8–9; see also Roe, supra note 161, at 32 (describing how there is
a growing divergence in goals between shareholder groups that are pro-profit versus those that
are pro-purpose).
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provides significant leeway to directors to fulfill fiduciary duties, so
asking them to serve the best interests of the corporate purpose is not
impossible. 182 Nevertheless, this construct provides a natural check on
the number of stakeholders a corporation will select to orient toward,
which limits the number of potential trade-offs. It would be too
managerially complex to report progress toward a wide swath of
stakeholders, so corporations would be wise to avoid overbroad purpose
statements. This structure would lead to greater corporate focus on
enumerated priorities and maintain directors’ clarity of direction.
Clarity of true corporate purpose also increases investor
certainty. The current regime, where executives support stakeholders
in the press but shareholders in the boardroom, 183 limits certainty on
corporate action and likely increases the cost of capital. 184 Because
investors and lenders do not understand the objectives or priorities of
management, there could be an uncertainty premium baked into
current agreements in case directors begin unscrupulously giving away
millions to various charities to the chagrin of lenders. More
importantly, the system in Delaware requires directors to perform
mental somersaults to determine how certain behavior ultimately
supports shareholders, even if the connection is attenuated. A system
that requires such circumnavigating is inefficient and increases
director, investor, lender, and customer uncertainty. 185 Dynamic
corporate purpose allows for a closer link between corporate action and
actual investor interests so shareholders can strategically allocate
resources to the corporate purposes they support and orient corporate
governance in the optimal direction in the process. 186
Lastly, dynamic corporate purpose limits agency concerns much
like shareholder primacy does. Proponents of wealth maximization
suggest that directors must orient toward shareholders because
shareholders are the owners, and, otherwise, their interests will be

182. Atkins et al., supra note 35.
183. See Warren, supra note 1 (illustrating companies’ public promises to serve all
stakeholders but subsequent refusals to provide action items on how they would do so).
184. See Wolfgang Drobetz, Sadok El Ghoul, Omrane Guedhami & Malte Janzen, Policy
Uncertainty, Investment, and the Cost of Capital, 39 J. FIN. STABILITY 28 (Aug. 30, 2018) (noting
that policy uncertainty increases the costs of capital). The reverse is also true, according to
scholars, where a positive corporate reputation—which could be a byproduct of more purposeful
corporations—decreases the costs of capital. See Damion Waymer & Sarah VanSlette, Corporate
Reputation Management and Issues of Diversity, in THE HANDBOOK OF COMMUNICATIONS AND
CORPORATE REPUTATION 471, 473 (Craig E. Carroll ed., 2013).
185. Some businesses have recognized this inefficiency and opted to convert to a PBC on their
own. See Veeva, supra note 61.
186. See Fischel, supra note 165, at 1277 (describing how investor passivity is rational).
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neglected. 187 A more dynamic model flips this concept on its head to get
to the same result—where shareholders approve or amend the
corporate purpose iteratively such that the gap between shareholder
will and corporate behavior shrinks. Instead of a judge telling the
shareholders what they should value, the shareholders select their
corporation’s purpose themselves. If shareholders feel like “their
money” 188 is being misallocated, they can amend the corporate purpose
to make it more shareholder-focused, just like they can vote to unseat
underperforming directors. In this way, by decentralizing corporate
purpose, the state can allow market forces to correct less-than-desired
results; managers and investors will take note of competitors and
determine whether to increase or decrease shareholder orientation
based on results in the marketplace. 189 This allows the state’s median
corporate purpose to oscillate until optimized. In these ways, dynamic
corporate purpose leverages market forces and the advantages of
shareholder primacy to chart a new course for governance.
C. Advantages of Drawing from Stakeholder Governance
Importantly, dynamic corporate purpose also leverages the
benefits of stakeholder governance. This construct gives corporations
some flexibility to promote wider societal interests directly, provides a
strong defense mechanism to asset-stripping activists, and promotes
purpose in the boardroom, which may improve corporate performance.
First, dynamic corporate purpose allows the financially focused
holding company to pursue a different corporate objective than the ecoconscious retailer. 190 This flexibility allows corporations to prioritize
and protect certain stakeholders that may otherwise be neglected under
a shareholder primacy model. 191 While the eco-friendly company very
well could charter as a PBC today, the competitive pressure to prioritize
some class of stakeholders will bring their competitors to face similar
187. See Friedman, supra note 27 (“Insofar as his actions in accord with his ‘social
responsibility’ reduce returns to stock holders, he is spending their money.”).
188. Id.
189. See Olga Hawn & Hyoung-Goo Kang, The Effect of Market and Nonmarket Competition
on Firm and Industry Corporate Social Responsibility, in 38 SUSTAINABILITY, STAKEHOLDER
GOVERNANCE, AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 313, 330 (Sinziana Dorobantu, Ruth V.
Aguilera, Jiao Luo & Frances J. Milliken eds., 2018) (showing that higher corporate social
responsibility in a firm’s competitors leads to higher corporate social responsibility for that firm in
response).
190. See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 143, at 1312 (“As with purely economic goals, the extent
to which a particular corporate purpose is desirable or effective depends on the comparative
advantage of the corporate form in pursing those goals.”).
191. See Ruggie et al., supra note 5 (saying the question has shifted “from whether corporate
boards should take stakeholder interests into account, to how it should do so”).
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strategic decisions. Market forces will encourage support for
stakeholder groups instead of incentivizing corporations to externalize
all costs to nonshareholders. 192 Scholars increasingly agree that
shareholder wealth maximization is not a sufficient proxy for wider
societal welfare, 193 so a more direct connection between shareholders
and selected stakeholders seems necessary. Because corporations will
report against progress made to their purposes, corporations will be
accountable to prioritized stakeholder groups as opposed to simply
supporting them in the press or having to justify actions on their behalf
with shareholders in mind.
Take employees, for example. If a company must prioritize its
employees to advance its corporate purpose, it will likely be able to
attract better talent, but the corporation will be held accountable to this
enumeration. If the directors are not promoting the interests of
employees through corporate behavior, shareholders could bring suit
that directors are not upholding their fiduciary duty of loyalty to the
corporate purpose. This tension is powerful. Corporations incur
litigation risk in the face of strategic advantages by adding a set of
prioritized stakeholders to their corporate purpose. This limiting factor
may lead to prioritizing less stakeholder groups per firm but will lead
to stronger support per stakeholder in the process.
Dynamic corporate purpose will also provide strong antitakeover
defenses. In a Revlon scenario today, if sale is inevitable, directors are
required to accept the proposal that will maximize shareholder
wealth—regardless of what may happen to the community, employees,
creditors, or other stakeholders. 194 This requirement has rightly upset
plenty of analysts who view short-termism as a pernicious byproduct of
shareholder wealth maximization that ultimately reduces total value of
corporations to society. 195 Here, directors will be required to remain
loyal to the corporate purpose, which could protect a class of
stakeholders outside of shareholders. If the corporate charter
prioritizes supplier relationships, directors could refuse a takeover
attempt that would harm the corporation’s ability to support its
suppliers. So, in essence, dynamic corporate purpose may erode some of
the short-term focus of the current corporate-governance regime too.

192. See STOUT, supra note 33, at 1 (“Shareholder value ideology focuses on the interests of
only a narrow subgroup of shareholders, those who are most short-sighted, opportunistic, willing
to impose external costs, and indifferent to ethics and others’ welfare.”).
193. See Blair, supra note 3, at 1 (describing how leading shareholder-primacy advocates have
shifted their opinions in the face of corporate scandals and financial crises).
194. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
195. See Lipton, supra note 66 (calling for a “New Paradigm” as a solution to short-termism).
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Lastly, proponents of stakeholder governance suggest that a
firm that is permitted to consider the interests of stakeholders will be
more committed to long-term value by being more purposeful. 196
Business schools today often teach the idea that clarity of purpose and
strategy leads to greater profitability. 197 Here, the state is calling on
directors to follow through with this concept and memorialize an
individualized corporate purpose in the firm’s charter. 198 As a result,
firms should act with more purpose, which not only has the potential to
support stakeholder interests but should also improve corporate
performance, benefitting shareholders. 199 As a result, dynamic
corporate purpose provides corporations the requisite flexibility to
better maximize total welfare and provides a mechanism to defend
against value-destroying short-termism in the process. This creates a
model of corporate purpose that neither shareholder primacy nor
stakeholder theory could provide on its own.
D. Risks and Limitations of Dynamic Corporate Purpose
Permitting incorporation without mandating a centralized
corporate purpose is not without disadvantages. Like any substantive
change in approach to a fundamental legal or existential question,
dynamic corporate purpose could impact the state less than anticipated
or even create unintended consequences. 200 High-level, these risks
include putting too much value on legally written statements,
burdening firms during the incorporation process, and balancing the
power dynamics of investors, managers, and stakeholders.

196. See id.
197. See, e.g., Serafeim & Gartenberg, supra note 64 (describing “high Purpose-Clarity
organizations” as those “that score high on purpose but also on dimensions of management clarity”
and noting that “high Purpose-Clarity organizations exhibit superior accounting and stock market
performance”); Adi Ignatius, Profit and Purpose, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.–Apr. 2019, at 10,
https://hbr.org/2019/03/profit-and-purpose [https://perma.cc/Y4FE-67EK] (noting that there are
companies “that have managed to create both financial and social value,” and these companies
accomplish this by “build[ing] a commitment to creating both kinds of value into their core
activities”).
198. See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 143, at 131 (arguing that corporate purpose serves as
an internal tool to manage expectations of shareholders and stakeholders, signal priorities, and
leverage competitive advantages of the individual firm).
199. Michael B. Dorff, James Hicks & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Future or Fancy? An
Empirical Study of Public Benefit Corporations, 11 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 113, 125 (2021) (“A
substantial management literature argues that investing in employee well-being results in better
long-term profitability outcomes.”).
200. Yosifon, supra note 36, at 463 (discussing how the creation of the PBC form may actually
narrow purpose flexibility in Delaware or may be all together trivial if shareholder primacy is just
a default rule).
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First, the biggest risk is that corporations would put forth
purpose statements that are vague or noncommittal to any particular
stakeholder group, which would increase shareholder uncertainty as
opposed to decreasing it. 201 Because corporate purpose will not be
centralized, investors, credit holders, future employees, and other
stakeholders may need to do additional due diligence before transacting
with corporations in the state. Ultimately, the state will need to ensure
that the DGCL lays out the requirements of a sound purpose statement
and will need to put forth a robust statement review process. While this
will lead to greater bureaucratic involvement in incorporation, it is a
small price to pay compared to potential regulations levied by other
solutions. The state could go as far as requiring that firms specifically
select which stakeholders the corporation will prioritize as opposed to
determining the corporation’s priorities based on its purpose
statement. 202
Similarly, there is a risk that all corporations, with the help of
legal counsel, would create seemingly uniform corporate purpose
statements that are watered down to decrease the probability of legal
action against directors. 203 Vague purpose statements would decrease
director accountability and erode the benefits of dynamic corporate
purpose. While the likelihood that all corporations would have similar
purposes under this system may be relatively high, the impact would
be minimally invasive to the overall regime. 204 First, every corporation
has the same corporate purpose today and under most reform concepts,
demonstrating that it is not per se harmful to the state when all
corporations are oriented toward a similar purpose. More importantly,
applying market discipline for corporations to orient in the direction
that makes the most sense for its owners will optimize corporate
purpose regardless of the ultimate direction selected by a critical mass
201. Corporations already do this to some degree when they merely state that the purpose of
the corporation is to “carry out any and all lawful activities.”
202. You could envision a literal checkbox in the incorporation process asking founders to
select prioritized parties among shareholders, employees, communities, suppliers, customers,
ecosystems, or other parties.
203. See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 112, at 2438 (describing how corporations
circumnavigated laws that limited corporate scope by using boilerplate language for their purpose
statement: “the corporation is formed to conduct and transact all lawful business activities allowed
under the laws of the state”).
204. Importantly, this purpose statement would not constrain the activities of the corporation
but rather would orient the board toward its stated purpose. As such, ultra vires actions for
ignoring the stated purpose would not arise, but directors would be expected to act with care and
loyalty toward the corporate purpose—whatever it may be. See Joan MacLeod Heminway,
Corporate Purpose and Litigation Risk in Publicly Held U.S. Benefit Corporations, 40 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 611, 628 (2017) (arguing that benefit corporations may open themselves up to ultra vires
actions if directors ignore the corporation’s stated public benefit).

362

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:1:325

of corporations. 205 In this sense, dynamic corporate purpose trusts that
the ultimate outcome of corporate purpose will optimize over the long
run even if individual corporations oscillate in the path toward such
optimization. Corporations may at first provide watered-down purpose
statements, but just as investors pressured corporations to de-classify
boards, 206 there will likely be pressure to orient directors toward an
optimal corporate purpose somewhere between shareholder primacy
and broad-range stakeholder consideration.
The bureaucratic burden of reporting against enumerated
objectives could be significant and could be a reason a state would not
mandate individualized purpose. Because stating a purpose would be
required for all corporations in the state as opposed to just large
entities, a likely critique would suggest that small businesses do not
have the necessary resources to select a purpose they will have a
fiduciary duty to uphold. First, this critique underestimates the
wherewithal of corporations’ fiduciaries—asking individuals to
determine who their corporation should be accountable to is not a
significant burden and does not require significant resources. 207
Further, if individuals incorporating a business simply cannot decide
an optimal orientation, shareholder primacy provides an easy default
option. As the business grows and gains resources, the shareholders can
vote to amend the corporate purpose based on any newfound epiphanies
as to principles. Thus, purpose statements may lead to some increased
legal work for large corporations, but there are numerous avenues for
directors to opt out of a more robust corporate purpose.
Lastly, because dynamic corporate purpose is fluid, there could
be concerns that the balance of power will shift. The debate over the
optimal orientation of directors would turn from academics and
legislators to directors and shareholders. Institutional investors, who
have already seen their power increase during the twenty-first century,
will set the course for corporate purpose, similar to how they have
dominated the discussions around other corporate-governance
issues. 208 Having shareholders set corporate orientation will represent

205. Fisch & Solomon, supra note 143, at 1344 (“Purpose thus extends the potential for
discipline beyond the capital markets to the product and labor markets.”).
206. Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Case Against Staggered Boards, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK
(Mar. 20, 2012, 12:43 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/the-case-against-staggeredboards [https://perma.cc/25MR-H5W5].
207. See Yosifon, supra note 36, at 483 (“The PBC’s notice and reporting requirements are not
particularly onerous or restrictive, although they might be undesirable for some people, because
they are costly or boring.”).
208. See Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance:
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2101–02 (2019) (describing how
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a shift in who decides the longstanding debate over purpose, but
external regulation can be enacted to control the behavior of these
entities more directly than can a one-size-fits-all approach to purpose.
While providing even more power to institutional investors is a
considerable risk, incentives will likely keep these voting blocs
relatively passive unless a corporation’s proposed purpose is far afield
of baseline expectations. Thus, legislators will have an opportunity to
regulate the behavior of corporate actors and institutional investors
more directly with heightened corporate accountability and investor
certainty, even if some risks are present.
This last point provides a reasonable summation of the debate
over corporate purpose. As has been discussed, some view regulatory
failure as a basis for corporate law to step in as a stopgap measure. That
idea confuses the role of corporate law and external regulation;
governance law should only be used to set rules and incentives with
clarity. Corporate governance does not exist to set some sort of policy
agenda, but a sound governance regime should allow for regulation to
be more effective. Dynamic corporate purpose will bring corporate
communications in line with corporate action such that legislators can
better understand where external regulation may be required. Dynamic
corporate governance is no silver bullet—corporations will still be
expected to pursue welfare maximization, but this regime will bring
greater clarity, accountability, and purpose to corporations. And that
should be the goal of corporate law.
CONCLUSION
Conveniently, the two poles of the corporate purpose debate are
both attempting to optimize for the same thing—maximum societal
welfare—by prioritizing different variables in the equation. Because
proponents of shareholder primacy and stakeholder governance have
the same end in mind, an approach that pulls from both concepts can
bridge the gap to cut the academic debate and provide states with a
better alternative. Shareholder primacy produces incentives for firms
to shirk responsibilities to wider society that inevitably produces
outsized externalities, requiring legislators to fill the gap with
regulation. Stakeholder governance reduces director accountability and
diminishes corporate performance such that the goals of greater societal
welfare are not achieved. The existing mechanisms to command and
control corporate purpose are inherently flawed, but an approach that
shareholder proposals have led to significant shifts in corporate-governance norms based on the
increasing power of institutional investors).
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shifts the balance of power through decentralization and market forces
can provide an antidote to this longstanding struggle.
Individual corporations should be able to provide their own set
of objectives and measurements of success to optimize corporate
purpose. By decentralizing the decision as to which parties for whom
corporations are managed, Delaware can provide directors greater
flexibility to support societal interests while mitigating agency concerns
and upholding economic fundamentals. Using the successful model of
PBCs, dynamic corporate purpose can supercharge corporate
performance, increase director accountability, provide clarity to
directors and investors, and improve corporate standing within society.
Delaware can do right by its citizens, its corporations, and stakeholders
far and wide by decentralizing corporate purpose to solve longstanding
governance flaws.
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